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Notes
TRANSGENDER AND THE JUDICIARY: AN
ARGUMENT TO EXTEND BATSON
CHALLENGES TO TRANSGENDER
INDIVIDUALS
I. INTRODUCTION
The shuffle of feet echoed in the courtroom as thirty individuals made
their way into the gallery.1 The judge and attorneys observed what
appeared to be a diverse body. Each side organized their questions and
awaited the judge’s instructions. The judge offered a few opening
remarks, housekeeping rules, and indicated with a nod that voir dire was
now underway.2 Voir dire is a familiar practice to the trial attorneys and
each side is well versed in its rules and procedures. The judge initiated
the jury selection process by questioning the potential jurors based on
their questionnaires, after which the attorneys were given the opportunity
to ask additional questions. The dispute before the panel of potential
jurors related to a licensing agreement and the pricing of HIV medications,
“the latter being a subject of considerable controversy in the gay
community.”3 SmithKline Beecham (“GSK”) brought the suit against
Abbott Laboratories (“Abbott”) alleging antitrust, breach of contract, and
unfair trade practice claims.4
Continuing with a line of questioning about employment, the judge
focused her attention on Juror C, a self-identified transgender male. Juror
C informed the judge that he worked as a computer technician for the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in San Francisco. Throughout the
conversation Juror C stated that his partner studied business. The judge
proceeded with follow up questions and the potential juror referred to his
partner three more times using the masculine pronoun he. In response to
This hypothetical situation is loosely based on SmithKline Beecham Corporation (“GSK”)
v. Abbott Laboratories. See 740 F.3d 471, 474–76 (9th Cir. 2014) (noting the facts of the original
case, which focused on a self-identified homosexual male, however these facts have been
altered to reflect an openly transgender male).
2
See MARGARET BULL KOVERA & BRIAN L. CUTLER, JURY SELECTION 7 (2013) (defining voir
dire as a “pretrial hearing in which attorneys and/or the judge question prospective jurors
in an attempt to uncover any bias that may threaten their impartiality”). Voir dire differs
depending on the jurisdiction and whether the case is pending in state or federal court. Id.
at 6.
3
GSK, 740 F.3d at 474.
4
Id.
1

719

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2016

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 50, No. 3 [2016], Art. 7

720

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50

the judge’s follow up questions, Juror C explained that he had friends with
HIV and personally took an Abbott or GSK medication. Subsequent to the
judge’s colloquy with the potential jurors, Abbott’s counsel began a brief
questioning of Juror C. First, Abbott’s counsel questioned Juror C’s
knowledge of the medication that was of central concern in the litigation.
Abbott’s counsel asked, “Do you know anything about the medications
that any of [your friends] are on?”5 Juror C stated he did not and the
attorney followed up with, “Do you know whether any of [your friends]
are taking any of the medications that we are going to be talking about
here[?]”6 Again, Juror C responded that he did not know whether his
friends were taking those medications. In total, Abbott’s counsel asked
Juror C five questions, all regarding his knowledge of the HIV
medications at issue in the litigation. Abbott’s counsel failed to ask Juror
C any questions that would determine his ability to decide the case fairly
and impartially.
Abbott exercised its first peremptory strike against Juror C.7 GSK’s
counsel immediately raised a Batson challenge explaining the first strike
was a peremptory of someone who is, or appears to be, transgender. 8 The
attorney stated Abbott’s use of a peremptory strike in that way was
discriminatory. GSK’s counsel explained the problem was that the
litigation involved AIDS medication, a medication well known in the
Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender (“LGBT”) community. GSK’s
counsel informed the judge that Abbott’s strike was an attempt to exclude
a transgender male from the jury pool. The judge responded that Batson

Id.
Id.
7
See Jason Matthew Lamb, Note, The Constitution, Peremptory Challenges, and United
States v. Martinez-Salazar, 22 WHITTIER L. REV. 843, 843 (2001) (stating peremptory
challenges are exercised during voir dire to remove a member of the venire who may be
biased); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 24 (2015) (providing the number of peremptory strikes each
side is entitled to use during voir dire). In capital cases when the government seeks to
impose the death penalty, each side may exercise twenty peremptory strikes. FED. R. CRIM.
P. 24. Other felony cases entitle the government to six peremptory strikes and the defendant
to ten peremptory challenges in situations where the defendant faces imprisonment for more
than one year. Id. In a misdemeanor case where the defendant is charged with a crime that
is punishable by imprisonment for one year or less, a fine, or both, each side has three
peremptory strikes. Id.
8
See JEFFERY T. FREDERICK, MASTERING VOIR DIRE AND JURY SELECTION: GAIN AN EDGE IN
QUESTIONING AND SELECTING YOUR JURY 288 (3d ed. 2011) (explaining that the Supreme
Court case Batson v. Kentucky established Batson challenges to address juror discrimination).
Subsequent to the Batson decision, the Court held that: (1) the defendant and juror do not
need to be the same race; (2) peremptory challenges may not be exercised in a discriminatory
manner by criminal defense attorneys; (3) discriminatory peremptory challenges may not be
used in civil trials; and (4) peremptory challenges may not be used against Hispanics and
Latinos in a discriminatory manner. Id.
5
6
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does not apply to transgender individuals. Moreover, the judge explained
that there was no way to know who is and is not transgender. GSK’s
counsel quickly reminded the judge that Juror C was a self-identified
transgender male. Regardless, the judge dismissed GSK’s objection to
Abbott’s strike and Juror C was removed from the venire.
A peremptory challenge on the basis of an individual being
transgender is not covered by a Batson challenge. Because a Batson
challenge is the only way to determine the counsel’s motivation for
exercising a peremptory strike, it is necessary to include transgender into
the class of minorities that are afforded Batson protection. Specifically, the
ongoing speculation and bias directed toward transgender individuals is
too frequent to turn the other way and allow prejudicial inferences to go
unsupported. This Note proposes that the Ninth Circuit’s analysis of
Batson as applied to sexual orientation should be expanded to transgender
individuals in federal courts.9 Part II of this Note provides the history of
Batson and discusses society’s understanding of transgender individuals.10
Part III of this Note analyzes the effect of Batson on sexual orientation and
urges its extension to transgender individuals.11 Finally, Part IV of this
Note concludes by reinforcing the idea that Batson was appropriately
expanded to sexual orientation and should again expand to include
transgender individuals.12
II. BACKGROUND
The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees a
right to an impartial jury of your peers.13 Unfortunately, impartiality is
not always easy to come by in a society overflowing with deeply rooted
opinions and beliefs.14 Voir dire, or the process of selecting jurors, is

See infra Part III (arguing that the court correctly applied Batson to sexual orientation
and asserting it should also be applied to transgender individuals).
10
See infra Part II (introducing Batson v. Kentucky and reviewing the pivotal cases that
followed as well as discussing societal views and discrimination towards transgender
individuals).
11
See infra Part III (examining the impact Batson had on sexual orientation and the need
to apply the same test to transgender individuals).
12
See infra Part IV (concluding the Ninth Circuit’s extension was appropriate and
proposing federal courts extend Batson to transgender persons during jury selection).
13
See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“[T]he accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury . . . ”).
14
See Karen Hughes & Mark Penn, What Are American Values These Days?, TIME (July 4,
2012),
http://ideas.time.com/2012/07/04/what-are-american-values-these-days-2/
[http://perma.cc/5UDX-YYZD] (discussing a belief in God and religion, family values, and
moral values as high among Americans).
9
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implemented to serve the goal of jury impartiality. 15 Voir dire has the
ability to allow individuals to partake in the judicial system, yet the
possibility for a potential juror to be stricken because of prejudice or bias
exists.16 Courts have ruled that screening potential jurors on factors that
cause inequality, such as race, gender, and sexual orientation is
unconstitutional.17 Although discrimination is a common occurrence in
regard to these traits, identifying as transgender is also a common basis

FREDERICK, supra note 8, at 2. In addition to attaining an impartial jury, voir dire has
four major goals: information gathering, rapport, education, and persuasion. Id.
Information gathering is the process of obtaining information from potential jurors and is
arguably the most important goal of voir dire. Id. Rapport concerns the ability of attorneys
to build a positive relationship with the jurors. Id. Education promotes a juror’s
understanding of legal principles and the law. Id. Persuasion regards an attorney’s influence
on a potential juror to adopt a specific perspective. Id.
16
See Suzy M. Sidote, Judging a Book by Its Cover: Lessons on Cracking the Voir Dire Code,
ABA (2008), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/labor_law/
meetings/2008/ac2008/138.authcheckdam.pdf [http://perma.cc/6TPF-RZ9D] (discussing
the pros and cons of voir dire); see also Valerie P. Hans & Alayna Jehle, Avoid Bald Men and
People With Green Socks? Other Ways to Improve the Voir Dire Process in Jury Selection, 78 CHI.KENT L. REV. 1179, 1198 (2003) (recommending four ways to improve voir dire and increase
the ability to recognize biased jurors during voir dire); Brian J. McKeen & Phillip B. Toutant,
The Case for Attorney-Conducted Voir Dire, 90 MICH. B. J. 30, 30 (2011) (explaining that
“attorney-conducted voir dire improves the truth-finding function of courts”). First, increase
the frequency with which juror questionnaires are used. Hans & Jehle, supra note 16, at 1198.
Second, change the method of questioning jurors during voir dire. Id. at 1199. Third,
broaden the types of questions asked of jurors during voir dire. Id. at 1200. Fourth, include
a time frame where attorneys may question jurors. Id. at 1201. Denying an attorney’s request
to participate in voir dire directly may infringe on the right to a fair trial. McKeen & Toutant,
supra note 16, at 30. Moreover, denying an individual the opportunity to participate in voir
dire may deprive parties of their equal protection rights. Id. See also FREDERICK, supra note
8, at 2 (noting two types of challenges that can be exercised by the party to prevent a potential
juror from sitting on the jury if there is a perceived bias or prejudice, challenges for cause
and peremptory challenges); KOVERA & CUTLER, supra note 2, at 14 (stating two methods that
may be used during voir dire for challenging the impartiality of a potential juror are
challenges for cause and peremptory challenges).
17
See infra Part II.A.2 (explaining three cases in which the court determined peremptory
challenges based on an individual’s race, gender, and sexual orientation are discriminatory).
See also Sandra L. Rierson, Race and Gender Discrimination: A Historical Case for Equal Treatment
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 1 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 89, 91 (1994) (discussing that
gender and race have been historically discriminated against); Civil Rights 101 Gays and
Lesbians, THE LEADERSHIP CONF. (2015), http://www.civilrights.org/resources/
civilrights101/sexualorientation.html [http://perma.cc/DT54-J6VD] (showing gays and
lesbians have been subjected to a long standing history of discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation). See generally GEORGE M. FREDRICKSON, RACISM A SHORT HISTORY 5 (2002)
(reviewing the history of racial discrimination).
15
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for inequality.18 Similar to individuals who identify as gay and lesbian,
transgender individuals also have a long history of discrimination.19
This Part of the Note introduces jury selection and provides a detailed
understanding of Batson, a pivotal turning point in the judicial system. 20
First, Part II.A.1 explains the process of selecting a jury and the use of
peremptory challenges.21 Next, Part II.A.2 introduces Batson to illustrate
the impact that decision had on voir dire.22 Third, Part II.A.3 reviews the
expansion of Batson to gender and sexual orientation. 23 Finally, Part II.B
discusses what it means to identify as transgender and outlines the history
of discrimination against transgender individuals.24
A. Voir Dire and the Creation of Batson Challenges
Jury selection is an essential process in furthering an individual’s
constitutional right to an impartial jury. 25 The act of selecting a jury is
comprised of several steps and procedures including strikes to remove a
potential juror.26 Using a strike to exclude an individual from the jury
pool is problematic when it is based on discriminatory reasons.27 In
See Non-Discrimination Laws, NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUALITY (2015),
http://transequality.org/issues/non-discrimination-laws [http://perma.cc/3S4M-SKM6]
(stating transgender people face discrimination in all aspects of life). The National Center
for Transgender Equality suggests improving several federal policy areas that would
improve transgender lives and promote anti-discrimination.
Id.
See also Issues,
TRANSGENDER LAW CTR., http://transgenderlawcenter.org/issues [http://perma.cc/EVE7T64M] (listing employment, family law, health care, housing, identity documents,
immigration, prisons, public accommodations, and youth as primary areas in which
transgender individuals frequently encounter discrimination).
19
See infra Part III.C (distinguishing transgender individuals from sexual orientation and
discussing the history of discrimination toward transgender people).
20
See infra Part III.A (reviewing the procedure of jury selection and explaining Batson).
21
See infra Part II.A.1 (explaining the process of jury selection and peremptory challenges).
22
See infra Part II.A.2 (introducing Batson and its effect on the voir dire process).
23
See infra Part II.A.3 (reviewing the expansion of Batson to gender and sexual
orientation).
24
See infra Part II.B (providing an understanding of what transgender means, including
misconceptions and stereotypes, and an overview of the discrimination faced by transgender
individuals).
25
See FREDERICK, supra note 8, at 2 (“[T]he goal of jury selection is to select an impartial
jury . . . .”); see also U.S. CONST. amend. VI (ensuring the right to an impartial jury).
26
See FREDERICK, supra note 8, at 5–10 (reviewing the jury selection process and
peremptory challenges); see also KOVERA & CUTLER, supra note 2, at 6 (providing an overview
of the jury selection process); Gary R. Giewat, Systematic Jury Selection and the Supplemental
Juror Questionnaire as a Means for Maximizing Voir Dire Effectiveness, 34 WESTCHESTER B.J. 49,
52 (2007) (explaining that systematic jury selection serves to reduce the likelihood of juror
bias).
27
See infra Part II.A (discussing the use of peremptory strikes to remove members of the
venire based on race, gender, and sexual orientation and explaining the Court’s view that
such motivating factors were discriminatory).
18
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Batson, the Court addressed the issue of racial discrimination during jury
selection and provided a foundation for ensuring equality during voir
dire.28 The Court extended Batson to include gender and sexual
orientation; therefore, widening the impermissible classifications that a
strike may be based on for the purpose of selecting a jury. 29 Part II.A.1
explains jury selection and peremptory challenges.30
Part II.A.2
31
introduces the landmark case, Batson v. Kentucky. Part II.A.3 discusses
the expansion of the Court’s decision.32
1.

Jury Selection and Peremptory Challenges

The process of selecting a jury begins by generating names of
individuals who make up a community.33 Once a jury pool has been
established, members of the venire participate in voir dire. 34 Voir dire is
defined as “[a] preliminary examination of a prospective juror by a judge
or lawyer to decide whether the prospect is qualified and suitable to serve
on a jury.”35 The purpose of voir dire is to allow both sides of the case the
opportunity to question potential jurors and determine whether the
individual is eligible to serve as a juror.36 To be eligible to sit on a jury, a
See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 100 (1986) (holding peremptory strikes based on an
individual’s race is discriminatory).
29
See generally J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 146 (1994) (finding peremptory
challenges premised on gender discrimination violate one’s constitutional rights and are
subject to Batson); SmithKline Beecham Corp. (“GSK”) v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471, 489 (9th
Cir. 2014) (holding sexual orientation is an impermissible basis for a peremptory challenge
and Batson applies).
30
See infra Part II.A.1 (explaining the process of selecting a jury and the procedures that
accompany jury selection).
31
See infra Part II.A.2 (discussing Batson v. Kentucky, the seminal case for Batson
challenges).
32
See infra Part II.A.3 (reviewing the Court’s decision to expand Batson beyond race).
33
See KOVERA & CUTLER, supra note 2, at 5–6 (explaining that the process of jury selection
starts with compiling a group of individuals). For an extended period of time, potential
jurors were generated using voter registration lists. Id. at 5. However, this process proved
problematic because it failed to represent a fair sampling of the community due to
demographic differences between individuals who register to vote and those that do not. Id.
To remedy demographic bias among potential jurors, multiple sources are now used to
generate jury pools including driver’s licenses, taxpayers, and recipients of unemployment
benefits. Id. at 6. See also 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (2012) (outlining a plan for random jury selection).
34
See KOVERA & CUTLER, supra note 2, at 6 (“The second stage of jury selection begins
when these potential jurors—called venirepersons—report to the courthouse for jury
service.”); see also Leah M. Provost, Note, Excavating from the Inside: Race, Gender, and
Peremptory Challenges, 45 VAL. U. L. REV. 307, 310–12 (2010) (reviewing the jury selection
process and introducing peremptory challenges).
35
Voir Dire, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (3d. pocket ed. 2006).
36
See RANDOLPH N. JONAKAIT, THE AMERICAN JURY SYSTEM 128 (2003) (discussing voir
dire as a process implemented to determine whether potential jurors will be impartial); see
28
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person must demonstrate the ability to remain unbiased or unprejudiced
in order to properly analyze the information presented and adhere to the
law.37 With impartiality as the primary goal of jury selection, voir dire
allows for challenges to remove members of the venire.38
There are two methods for striking, or challenging, a potential juror:
challenges for cause and peremptory challenges. 39 The former is exercised
when a member of the venire demonstrates a personal bias or prejudice
that would inhibit their ability to remain impartial.40 The latter allows
attorneys to excuse a potential juror without articulating a reason. 41
also FREDERICK, supra note 8, at 2 (explaining the selection of an impartial jury is the primary
goal behind jury selection); David Kennedy, Jury Voir Dire, 41 AUG-MD. B.J. 34, 36 (2008)
(“Voir dire is an important element in protecting the constitutional right to an impartial
jury.”).
37
See Developments in the Law—The Civil Jury III. Jury Selection and Composition, 110 HARV.
L. REV. 1443, 1454 (1997) (describing exceptions and exemptions that enable a potential juror
to refrain from serving on a jury). An individual selected for jury duty may use a hardship
excuse, which requires the individual to articulate an undue hardship that would result if
the individual were required to commit to jury duty. Id. at 1455. However, such excuses
ultimately make ensuring an impartial jury more difficult. Id. Although potential jurors
might have a sincere interest in avoiding jury duty, the interest in a representative pool
outweighs that of the individual. Id.
38
See RICHARDSON R. LYNN, JURY TRIAL LAW AND PRACTICE 45 (1986) (pointing out the
constitutional requirements of the venire for the jury selection process). The right to an
impartial jury guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment requires that the venire be compromised
of a fair cross section of the community. Id. See also Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court
and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory Challenges, and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV.
153, 157 (1989) (examining voir dire and the process of eliminating prospective jurors).
39
See FREDERICK, supra note 8, at 2 (stating a potential juror may be excused from the
venire through the exercise of a challenge for cause or a peremptory challenge); see also
KOVERA & CUTLER, supra note 2, at 14 (noting two methods that may be used to challenge the
impartiality of a potential juror: challenges for cause and peremptory challenges); Barbara
Allen Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving “Its Wonderful Power”, 27 STAN. L. REV. 545, 545–46 (1975)
(discussing challenges for cause and peremptory challenges used during voir dire).
Traditionally attorneys used challenges for cause in situations where the juror was a relative
of one of the parties or his or her participation would result in a mistrial. Babcock, supra note
39, at 549–50. Peremptory challenges, unlike challenges for cause, may be used without
providing a reason for its use. Id. at 550.
40
See KOVERA & CUTLER, supra note 2, at 14 (stating a challenge for cause is exercised when
the individual who is conducting voir dire believes the potential juror demonstrated a bias
or prejudice that would prevent him or her from ensuring a fair evaluation of the evidence).
Personal experiences and attitudes are types of sources of bias that may be used to support
a challenge for cause. Id. See also FREDERICK, supra note 8, at 2 (explaining that challenges for
cause focus on the inability of the potential juror to “meet specific statutory qualifications”).
Examples of statutory qualifications include bias or prejudice or residential requirements.
Id.
41
See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965) (differentiating challenges for cause from
peremptory challenges). “While challenges for cause permit rejection of jurors on a narrowly
specified, provable and legally cognizable basis of partiality, the peremptory permits
rejection for a real or imagined partiality that is less easily designated or demonstrable.” Id.
(quoting Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 70 (1887)). See also JONAKAIT, supra note 36, at 139
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Peremptory challenges are limited and vary by jurisdiction. 42 These
challenges are heavily restricted because attorneys are not required to
provide support for the challenge.43 When a peremptory challenge is
used, a litigant will ask to excuse the potential juror unless opposing
counsel raises an objection to the strike. 44 Attorneys may object when a
challenge appears motivated by discrimination or the potential juror
belongs to a protected class.45
The practice of removing potential jurors that belong to a protected
class is prohibited “because of concerns that the removal of entire
categories of jurors will deprive the jury of certain attitudes or life
(explaining that peremptory challenges “are exercised by the parties after rulings on the
challenges for cause”). A peremptory challenge does not require the “showing of bias”
provided it is not implemented for the purpose of excluding a juror on the basis of race or
gender. Id. See also KOVERA & CUTLER, supra note 2, at 19 (noting that attorneys can excuse
potential jurors using a peremptory challenge, which does not require the attorney to
provide a reason for the challenge). Since potential jurors are required to swear that all bias
will be put aside while hearing the evidence, attorneys are not required to demonstrate that
actual bias exists when exercising a peremptory challenge. Id. at 19–20.
42
See JONAKAIT, supra note 36, at 139 (showing that jurisdictions vary on the number of
peremptory challenges allowed). “Although numbers vary, peremptory challenges exist for
all civil and criminal jury trials.” Id. See also KOVERA & CUTLER, supra note 2, at 20 (stating
that unlike challenges for cause, peremptory challenges are limited and vary by jurisdiction,
trial type, crime seriousness, and other factors such as the size of the jury). Even though
peremptory challenges are restricted in the number available, a judge has the discretion to
grant additional peremptory challenges if he believes it would ensure an impartial jury. Id.;
see also Gary C. Furst, Note, Will the Religious Freedom Restoration Act be Strike Three Against
Peremptory Challenges?, 30 VAL. U. L. REV. 701, 701–03 (1996) (explaining the purpose of
peremptory challenges and its constitutional restrictions).
43
See JOSHUA DRESSLER & ALAN C. MICHAELS, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE VOLUME 2:
ADJUDICATION 225 (4th ed. 2006) (providing an overview of peremptory challenges
including three purposes the challenge serves to promote). First, a peremptory challenge
may be used as a backup to challenges for cause. Id. Second, peremptory challenges
“provide the parties with an opportunity to participate in the construction of the decisionmaking body, thereby enlisting their confidence in its decision.” Id. at 226. Third,
peremptory challenges enable parties to take advantage of the “core of truth in most common
stereotypes.” Id.
44
See Furst, supra note 42, at 701–02 (stating peremptory challenges afford litigants “a
means of obtaining the right to a fair trial by an impartial jury”); Jay M. Spears, Note, Voir
Dire: Establishing Minimum Standards to Facilitate the Exercise of Peremptory Challenges, 27
STAN. L. REV. 1493, 1502 (1975) (stating the judicial system allows parties to use a peremptory
challenge in order to strike members of the venire).
45
See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1879) (holding it is impermissible to
exclude cognizable groups from serving on juries). See also LYNN, supra note 38, at 97
(discussing that peremptory challenges “allow flexibility in striking jurors about whom you
feel uncomfortable, but cannot show bias sufficient for a challenge for cause”). Only
specifically knowledgeable jurors can be removed with a peremptory challenge. Id. In
addition, peremptory challenges may “relieve social pressures that might result if counsel
expressed the stereotyped, sometimes racist, view of people that motivates many
challenges.” Id. at 98.
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experiences that may be relevant for evaluating the evidence in a case.” 46
Swain v. Alabama addressed the problem with precluding persons from
serving as jurors based on certain characteristics or traits.47 The Supreme
Court recognized the issue with using a peremptory challenge to remove
all African American venire members.48 However, the Court reasoned
“[t]he essential nature of the peremptory challenge is . . . one exercised
without a reason stated, without inquiry and without being subject to the
court’s control.”49 Therefore, Swain held that the presumption that the
prosecutor used the challenge to obtain an impartial jury stands and
cannot be overcome absent evidence.50 The Court reexamined its stance
in Batson.51
2.

The Batson v. Kentucky Decision

In 1986, a Kentucky state court convicted an African American man
on charges of second-degree burglary and receipt of stolen goods. 52 The
KOVERA & CUTLER, supra note 2, at 22 (quoting Hans & Vidmar, 1982).
See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 209 (1965) (reviewing the issue of whether a black
man was unjustly removed from the venire during jury selection because he was black).
Swain dealt with an African American male convicted of rape. Id. at 203. Swain challenged
his conviction on the grounds that Alabama violated the Fourteenth Amendment Equal
Protection Clause when all six African Americans were removed from the venire through
peremptory challenges. Id. at 210. The Supreme Court acknowledged that the systematic
removal of venirepersons based solely on race would be discriminatory, however, Swain
failed to meet his burden and demonstrate that the state had used its peremptory challenges
to purposely remove all African Americans from all cases across the county. Id. at 224.
48
See id. at 222–23 (stating that the petitioner’s claim raises an issue regarding the removal
of all African Americans from the venire); see also DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 43, at 228
(explaining that in Swain, the Court recognized “race, religion, nationality, occupation or
affiliations of people summoned for jury duty” as a basis for frequent peremptory
challenges).
49
Swain, 380 U.S. at 220 (quoting State v. Thompson, 206 P.2d 1037, 1039 (1949)).
50
See id. at 222 (stating the presumption that the prosecutor is using the challenge for the
purpose of obtaining a fair and impartial jury is not overcome). See also DRESSLER &
MICHAELS, supra note 43, at 228 (summarizing that “the Court insulated from inquiry the
prosecution’s use of peremptory challenges to remove African-Americans in a particular
case”). Furthermore, Swain noted that where a defendant “might have a valid Fourteenth
Amendment claim,” he would still have the burden of establishing the existence of “extreme,
ongoing practice” of removing African Americans from the venire. Id. See also KOVERA &
CUTLER, supra note 2, at 23 (noting the Swain decision required the defendant to provide
evidence of “systematic racial discrimination across cases in the prosecution’s use of
peremptory challenges” to establish a Fourteenth Amendment violation).
51
See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 82 (1986) (stating the Court is required to reexamine the Swain decision regarding the evidentiary burden placed on a criminal defendant
who alleges he was denied equal protection through the State’s use of peremptory challenges
used to exclude members of his race from the jury).
52
See id. (introducing the petitioner and reiterating the Court’s need to reevaluate the
precedent set forth under Swain); see also Jean Montoya, The Future of the Post-Batson
46
47
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trial took place in the Jefferson County Circuit Court where the presiding
judge conducted voir dire.53 Members of the venire included both white
and African American individuals.54 During the jury selection process,
the prosecutor permissibly used his peremptory challenges to excuse all
four African American members of the venire.55 The petitioner’s counsel
moved to discharge the jury on the ground that the prosecutor’s
peremptory challenges violated the petitioner’s rights under the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments.56 The defense argued the prosecutor’s act of
Peremptory Challenge: Voir Dire by Questionnaire and the “Blind” Peremptory, 29 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 981, 982 (1996) (stating the 1986 Batson decision is where the Court began “to tackle
the problem of race and gender discrimination in jury selection”).
53
Batson, 476 U.S. at 82–83. See FREDERICK, supra note 8, at 5 (demonstrating that voir dire
may be conducted by either an attorney, judge, or both). The voir dire style depends on who
is questioning the potential jurors. Id. Generally, in federal courts judges conduct voir dire
whereas in state courts the attorney plays a more pivotal role in the examination of potential
jurors. Id. Although it is not necessarily of high importance who conducts voir dire, judges
are highly regarded and therefore, voir dire conducted by a judge may be less likely to yield
honest and candid responses from the members of the venire. Id. See also Michelle Mahony,
The Future Viability of Batson v. Kentucky and the Practical Implications of Purkett v. Elem, 16
REV. LITIG. 137, 145 (1997) (explaining that at trial the judge conducted the “initial” phase of
voir dire examination).
54
Batson, 476 U.S. at 83. Swain, like Batson, also dealt with race as a primary issue with
regard to the jury and peremptory strikes. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 205 (1965); see
also DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 43, at 228 (describing the Swain jury as one comprised
of only white jurors after the prosecution struck all six of the African Americans in the
venire).
55
Batson, 476 U.S. at 83. Justice Rehnquist explained that such strikes are not
unconstitutional, “so long as such challenges are also used to exclude whites in cases
involving white defendants, Hispanics in cases involving Hispanic defendants, Asians in
cases involving Asian defendants, and so on.” Id. at 137–38 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See
also DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 43, at 229 (inquiring whether the exercise of a
peremptory challenge based only on the assumption that a juror might be more sympathetic
to a defendant that shares his race is unconstitutional racial discrimination). The Court’s
earlier decisions struck systems that excluded certain races or treated individuals of a certain
race as unqualified. Id. See generally Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 588 (1935) (addressing
the constitutionality of excluding African Americans from serving on grand or petit juries).
56
Batson, 476 U.S. at 83. The Sixth Amendment states:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein
the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been
previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him;
to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Fourteenth Amendment states:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
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removing all four African American members of the venire deprived the
petitioner of his right “to a jury drawn from a cross section of the
community” as well as his right to equal protection of the laws.57 The
judge ruled that the parties were entitled to use their peremptory
challenges to “strike anybody they want to.” 58 The petitioner’s motion
was denied and an all-white jury convicted the petitioner on both counts.59
Following the jury’s decision, the petitioner appealed to the Kentucky
Supreme Court to challenge the prosecutor’s use of peremptory
challenges.60 The petitioner urged the court to follow precedent of other
states and hold that the prosecutor’s conduct violated his Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights.61 The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed

due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
57
Batson, 476 U.S. at 83.
58
Id. See Jeffrey Bellin & Junichi P. Semitsu, Widening Batson’s Net to Ensnare More Than
the Unapologetically Bigoted or Painfully Unimaginative Attorney, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1075, 1085
(2011) (stating peremptory challenges, although not mandated by the Constitution, have a
very long history dating back to English Common Law). Peremptory challenges are
permissible to remove a member of the venire “without a reason stated, without inquiry and
without being subject to the court’s control.” Id. (quoting Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202,
220 (1965)).
59
See Batson, 476 U.S. at 83 (explaining that the defense’s request for a hearing to address
the motion to discharge the jury was denied). The trial judge failed to expressly rule on the
defense’s request for a hearing, but instead observed that both parties were entitled to use
their peremptory challenges to “strike anybody they wanted to.” Id. The judge further
articulated that the cross section requirement is only applicable to the selection of the venire
and not to the selection of the petit jury itself. Id.
60
See id. (noting that following the judge’s denial of the petitioner’s motion to discharge
the jury and the subsequent conviction of the petitioner, the petitioner appealed to the
Kentucky Supreme Court).
61
See id. (urging the court to follow the principles in People v. Wheeler and Commonwealth
v. Soares). Wheeler held that the use of peremptory challenges to remove prospective jurors
from the venire based solely on group bias violates the right to trial by a jury drawn from a
representative cross section of the community. People v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748, 768 (Cal.
1978). Soares ruled that defendants convicted of first-degree murder sufficiently established
a prima facie case that the use of peremptory challenges by the prosecution were designed
to exclude persons from a trial jury on the basis of race, and the court’s failure to allow a
hearing on the issue deprived the defendants of their constitutionally guaranteed right to a
jury drawn from the community. Commonwealth v. Soares, 387 N.E.2d 499, 518 (Mass.
1979). The petitioner in Batson argued the Court should find that the prosecutor’s
peremptory challenges violated his Sixth Amendment rights as well as section eleven of
Kentucky’s Constitution. Batson, 476 U.S. at 83. The petitioner further argued that the facts
demonstrated the prosecutor engaged in a “pattern” of discriminatory challenges in this
case, and under Swain, established an equal protection violation. Id. at 84.
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the holding of the trial court by stating its reliance on Swain.62 The
Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari.63
In a thirty-four page opinion, the Court held that denying a person
participation in jury service based on his or her race is discriminatory and
unconstitutional.64 The Court reversed and remanded it back to the
Kentucky Supreme Court.65 The Court further articulated a three step
inquiry to address the concern of racially motivated peremptory
challenges.66 First, the defendant must establish a prima facie case of
purposeful discrimination.67 Second, once a prima facie case has been
See Batson, 476 U.S. at 84 (declining to follow other state’s precedent that the petitioner
set forth and reaffirming its reliance on Swain). The court found that a defendant who alleges
a lack of a fair cross section must establish a systematic exclusion of a body of jurors from
the venire. Id.
63
Id.
64
See id. at 100 (holding that peremptory challenges on the basis of race are
discriminatory). The Court reaffirmed the principle previously articulated in Swain, which
“recognized that a [s]tate’s purposeful or deliberate denial to Negroes on account of race of
participation as jurors in the administration of justice violates the Equal Protection Clause.”
Id. at 84 (quoting Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 203–04 (1965)); see also John J. Hoeffner,
Note, Defendant’s Discriminatory Use of the Peremptory Challenge After Batson v. Kentucky, 62
ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 46, 49 (1987) (summarizing the Batson decision as a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause and Fourteenth Amendment). In Batson, the Court “emphasized the jury’s
central position as a protective barrier against the arbitrary exercise of power by the state,
and stated that to allow purposeful discrimination in jury selection would endanger this
protection.” Hoeffner, supra note 64, at 49 (quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 86).
65
Batson, 476 U.S. at 100. The Court noted that if the trial court determines that the facts
presented establish “prima facie” that purposeful discrimination occurred and the
prosecutor fails to provide a neutral reason for his action, then the Court’s precedent requires
the petitioner’s conviction be reversed. Id. The Court cited several cases as precedent,
including: Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 551 (1967) (holding that proof that the state
employed identical procedures, which resulted in discrimination of the petitioner’s initial
trial “constituted a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination” in jury selection);
Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 482 (1954) (ruling individuals who are of Mexican descent
constitute a separate class from white individuals and members of that class had been
systematically excluded from jury service); Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 463, 468–69 (1947)
(holding the state of Mississippi “failed to meet the very strong evidence of purposeful racial
discrimination made out by the petitioner upon the uncontradicted showing that for thirty
years or more no Negro had served as a juror in the criminal courts of Lauderdale County”).
66
See Batson, 476 U.S. at 96 (describing a three step test to determine whether an exercised
peremptory challenge was discriminatory); see also DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 43, at
230 (pointing out that the Batson Court determined that Swain required defendants to meet
“a crippling burden of proof [that] effectively immuniz[ed] peremptory challenges from
constitutional scrutiny”). As a result of the Court’s decision in Batson, Swain’s “no-prooffrom-a-single-case rule” was abandoned and in its place, the Court established the
framework for a Batson challenge. DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 43, at 230.
67
See Batson, 476 U.S. at 96 (explaining that a prima facie case is the first step in
establishing purposeful discrimination). The Court notes that to establish a prima facie case,
the defendant is first required to show that he belongs to a cognizable racial group and that
the prosecutor exercised a peremptory challenge for the purpose of removing potential
62
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established, the burden shifts to the prosecution to provide a neutral, or
nondiscriminatory reason for the peremptory challenge.68 Third, the
judge reviews the record and determines whether the challenge is racially
motivated and therefore unconstitutional. 69 The Court relied heavily on
the principle set forth in Strauder and reexamined Swain.70 On evaluation
jurors who are also members of the same racial group. Id. Second, the Court states that the
defendant may only rely on the fact that a peremptory challenge constitutes a jury selection
process that allows “those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate.” Id. (quoting
Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562 (1953)). Finally, the Court explained that the defendant
must show these facts and any other relevant circumstances raise an inference that the
prosecutor used the practice to exclude members of the venire from the jury based on their
race. Id. See also Timeliness of Batson Challenge, 12 NO. 4 FED. LITIGATOR 117, 117 (1997)
(suggesting a Batson challenge should be exercised immediately following opposing
counsel’s use of a peremptory strike to exclude a potential juror on the basis of
discrimination).
68
See Batson, 476 U.S. at 97 (discussing the second step in a Batson challenge is that the
State, or the party who exercised the peremptory challenge, has the burden to prove that the
strike was made for a neutral reason). The Court noted that although this requirement
imposes a limitation in some cases on the full character of the peremptory challenge, it
emphasized that the prosecutor’s explanation did not need to rise to the level of a challenge
for cause, which required justification for the strike. Id. The Court also stated that the
prosecutor may not simply rebut the defendant’s prima facie case by stating he challenged
the jurors that shared the “defendant’s race on the assumption— or his intuitive judgment—
that” those individuals would be partial to the defendant because they shared race. Id.
Further, the Court explained that the prosecutor may not rebut the defendant’s case just “by
denying that he had a discriminatory motive or affirm[ing] [his] good faith in making
individual selections.” Id. at 98 (quoting Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 632 (1972)).
See also Thompson v. United States, 469 U.S. 1024, 1026 (1984) (reviewing the exercise of
peremptory challenges); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 598–99 (1935) (discussing the
necessary evidentiary support to rebut a prima facie case made by the defendant); McCray
v. Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113, 1132 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding that subsequent to a prima facie
showing, the prosecution need only provide “genuine reasons” for the challenge).
69
See Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 (providing the third step of a Batson challenge as the trial
court’s requirement to review the record and determine if a showing of intentional
discrimination was made). See also Kenneth J. Melilli, Batson in Practice: What We Have
Learned About Batson and Peremptory Challenges, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447, 447 (1995–96)
(explaining that the procedure for Batson challenges ends with the trial judge’s ruling on the
legitimacy of the claim). Melilli suggests the entire process of jury selection is “one of
discrimination” and thus the underlying issue in the exercise of a Batson challenge is
“whether the criteria upon which the discriminations are based are reasonable and
acceptable.” Id. at 449.
70
See Batson, 476 U.S. at 85–90 (reviewing Strauder v. West Virginia and its established
principles, as well as stating that Swain v. Alabama required reexamination). The Court
stressed that the principles announced in Strauder have never been questioned by the Court,
but rather “the Court has been called upon repeatedly to review the application of those
principles to particular facts.” Id. at 90. See also Judge Royal Furguson, The Jury in To Kill a
Mockingbird: What Went Wrong?, 73 TEX. B.J. 488, 488 (2010) (describing Strauder as the first
in a long line of cases in which “[t]he Supreme Court first dealt with the question of whether
minorities could protect their own rights against discrimination”). In the 1879 case of
Strauder, the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment forbids the state from barring men,
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of these cases, the Court determined that “[p]urposeful racial
discrimination in selection of the venire violates a defendant’s right to
equal protection because it denies him the protection that a trial by jury is
intended to secure.”71 Thus, Batson laid the foundation for racial equality
in jury selection, and that foundation supports its extension.72
3.

The Supreme Court Expands Batson

The idea that a peremptory challenge could no longer be utilized as it
pertained to race without neutral justification was monumental. 73 In
essence, the Supreme Court announced that peremptory challenges
prompted by blatant discrimination could no longer be attributed to a
counsel’s intuition of perceived bias.74 Eight years after the Batson
decision, the Supreme Court ruled in J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B. that
based on race, from the jury pool. Id. The Court reasoned that excluding an African
American man from jury service was equivalent to branding the individual and “prevented
equal justice which the law aims to secure to all others.” Id. (quoting Strauder v. State of
West Virginia, 100 U.S. (10 Otto) 303, 308 (1879)); see also Montoya, supra note 52, at 987
(regarding Swain as a decision in which the “Supreme Court actually condoned the exercise
of group-based peremptory challenges, including peremptory challenges based on race”).
The Swain decision declined to scrutinize the prosecutor’s actions in a particular case by
relying on a presumption that he properly exercised the State’s challenges. Batson, 476 U.S.
at 91. However, the Court further observed that a state “may not exercise its challenges in
contravention of the Equal Protection Clause.” Id.
71
Batson, 476 U.S. at 86.
72
See id. at 100 (holding that peremptory challenges on the basis of one’s race are
discriminatory and entitled to further review under a three step test); see also Jeanette E.
Walston, Do Non-Discriminatory Peremptory Strikes Really Exist, or Is a Juror’s Right to Sit on a
Jury Denied When the Court Allows the Use of Peremptory Strikes?, 17 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV.
371, 377 (2010) (reviewing the establishment of Batson and its extension); Mikal C. Watts &
Emily C. Jeffcott, A Primer on Batson, Including Discussion of Johnson v. California, Miller-El
v. Dretke, Rice v. Collins, & Snyder v. Louisiana, 42 ST. MARY’S L. J. 337, 347 (2011) (“Since
2005, the Supreme Court has reinforced the Batson framework that prohibits the use of
peremptory strikes as a tool for racial discrimination.”).
73
See Charles J. Ogletree, Just Say No!: A Proposal to Eliminate Racially Discriminatory Uses
of Peremptory Challenges, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1099, 1101 (1994) (describing Batson as a major
accomplishment in the effort to eliminate jury discrimination based on race); see also John
Gibeaut, Challenging Peremptories, ABA J. (Aug. 29, 2005, 6:31 AM), http://www.aba
journal.com/magazine/article/challenging_peremptories/
[http://perma.cc/UP6WNCXA] (discussing Justice Marshall’s praise of the Court’s decision to end racial
discrimination “by banning prosecutors from using peremptory challenges to cover racially
motivated strikes of black jurors”).
74
See Timothy Patton, The Discriminatory Use of Peremptory Challenges in Civil Litigation:
Practice, Procedure and Review, 19 TEX. TECH L. REV. 921, 924 (1988) (stating that because of
Batson, peremptory challenges are no longer immune from judicial scrutiny); see also James
R. Gadwood, The Framework Comes Crumbling Down: Juryquest in a Batson World, 88 B.U. L.
REV. 291, 295 (2008) (explaining the Court’s holding in Batson as one that applied the
Fourteenth Amendment peremptory challenges and ruled that “the Equal Protection Clause
forbids the prosecutor to challenge potential jurors solely on account of their race”).
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Batson would be extended to gender.75 Twenty years later, the Ninth
Circuit held in SmithKline Beecham Corporation (“GSK”) v. Abbott
Laboratories that the Batson analysis applied to peremptory challenges
based on sexual orientation.76 This Part of the Note discusses J.E.B. and
the Court’s reason for applying Batson to gender followed by an
examination of the Ninth Circuit’s decision to extend Batson to sexual
orientation.77
In 1994, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether
the Equal Protection Clause forbade peremptory challenges on the basis
of gender.78 The question arose from an Alabama district court case that
involved the paternity and child support of a minor. 79 The State of
Alabama filed a complaint on behalf of the minor’s mother against the
petitioner, a male, to determine paternity and order child support
payments.80 The trial court generated a jury pool of twelve males and
twenty-four females.81 During voir dire, the State exercised nine of its ten
See 511 U.S. 127, 146 (1994) (holding that the intentional discrimination on the basis of
gender in the use of peremptory challenges violates the equal protection clause).
76
See 740 F.3d 471, 489 (9th Cir. 2014) (finding peremptory challenges based on an
individual’s sexual orientation is discriminatory).
77
See infra Part II.A.3 (reviewing the Court’s decision to extend Batson to gender in J.E.B.
v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., and the Ninth Circuit’s decision to extend Batson to sexual orientation
in GSK).
78
See J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 129 (stating the Court is faced with the question of “whether the
Equal Protection Clause forbids intentional discrimination on the basis of gender”); see also
Hon. Cameron McGowan Currie & Aleta M. Pillick, Gender-Based Peremptory Strikes: A Post
J.E.B. Analysis, 7-FEB S.C. LAW. 14, 17 (1996) (noting that the Alabama Court of Appeals
rejected the argument that the state had violated the Constitution by excluding jurors on the
basis of gender).
79
See J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 129–30 (explaining the pretext of the case); see also David G. Hart
& Russell D. Cawyer, Batson and Its Progeny Prohibit the Use of Peremptory Challenges Based
Upon Disability and Religion: A Practitioner’s Guide for Requesting a Civil Batson Hearing, 26
TEX. TECH L. REV. 109, 111 (1995) (discussing the Alabama case as one that arose out of the
State’s decision to file a complaint for paternity and child support against J.E.B., the
petitioner).
80
See J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 129, 131 (establishing the facts of the case). The District Court of
Jackson County in Alabama called the matter forth for trial on behalf of the mother and began
jury selection. Id. See also Susan Hightower, Sex and the Peremptory Strike: An Empirical
Analysis of J.E.B. v. Alabama’s First Five Years, 52 STAN. L. REV. 895, 898 (2000) (revisiting J.E.B.
and summarizing the main points of the pivotal case in gender equality).
81
J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 129. See also Christopher M. Ferdico, The Death of the Peremptory
Challenge: J.E.B. v. Alabama, 28 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1177, 1179–80 (1995) (acknowledging the
fact that the jury pool consisted of thirty-six individuals). Initially, the court assembled sixtytwo potential jurors for the panel. Id. at 1179. On review of the initial number of potential
jurors, the judge determined that sixty-two individuals was excessive and subsequently
instructed the court clerk to remove every other name until the number of potential jurors
was thirty-six. Id. at 1179–80. With the venire set at twenty-four females and twelve males,
the court utilized a struck jury method to select the petit jury. Id. at 1180. The first three
members of the venire were struck using challenges for cause. Id. See also Keith A. Ward,
75
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peremptory challenges to remove the male jurors.82 Previously, the court
excused three potential jurors for cause, therefore leaving only ten male
members of the venire prior to the State’s peremptory challenges. 83 As a
result, females made up the entire jury.84 Subsequently, the petitioner
objected to the State’s peremptory challenges asserting each were
exercised on the basis of gender.85 The court declined to follow the
petitioner’s claim and proceeded with the all-female jury.86 The jury
found the petitioner to be the father and the court ordered him to pay child
support.87 On review of the case, the Supreme Court held that, although
a “relatively recent phenomenon[,]” peremptory challenges on the basis
of gender are, like race, unconstitutional.88
“The Only Thing in the Middle of the Road is a Dead Skunk and a Yellow Stripe”: Peremptory
Challenges—Take ‘Em or Leave ‘Em, 26 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1361, 1367 (1995) (explaining that
subsequent to challenges for cause in which three jurors were removed from the venire, the
jury pool consisted of ten males and twenty-three females).
82
J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 129. See also Ferdico, supra note 81, at 1180 (reviewing the party’s
exercise of peremptory challenges). The State, going first, exercised nine of its ten
peremptory challenges. Id. J.E.B., however, used all ten of its peremptory challenges to
remove nine women and the last male on the jury panel. Id.
83
J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 129. See also Stacie L. Sanders, Constitutional Law: Eliminating GenderBased Peremptory Strikes: The End of the Peremptory Challenge? [J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.,
114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994)], 34 WASHBURN L.J. 193, 197 (1995) (noting three members of the venire,
one female and two males, were excused from the venire for cause).
84
J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 129. See also Ward, supra note 81, at 1367 (explaining that following
challenges for cause and peremptory challenges, the jury was comprised of all females).
85
See J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 129 (arguing that the logic of Batson forbids intentional
discrimination on the basis of gender). The petitioner argued the State’s peremptory
challenges directed toward males violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id. The petitioner urged the court to follow the reasoning of Batson and find
the peremptory challenge intentionally discriminated against gender. Id.
86
See id. (finding the petitioner’s claim to be unpersuasive); see also Trlica Cosby, Strictly
Speaking: Viewing J.E.B. v. Alabama Ex Rel. T.B. as Sub Silentio Application of Strict Scrutiny to
Gender-Based Classifications, 32 HOUS. L. REV. 869, 872 (1995) (discussing the court’s rejection
of the petitioner’s argument).
87
J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 129.
88
Id. at 131. The Court stated gender-based peremptory strikes were hardly practicable
during most of our country’s existence and until the twentieth century, women were
completely excluded from jury service. Id. In its analysis, the Court stipulated that it was
not necessary to determine whether women or racial minorities have suffered more at the
hands of discriminatory state actors during the decades of the Nation’s history, but rather, it
was only necessary to acknowledge that “our Nation has had a long and unfortunate history
of sex discrimination.” Id. at 136. The Court then went on to state that the Equal Protection
Clause prohibits discrimination in jury selection on the basis of gender or on the assumption
that an individual will be biased in a particular case for no reason other than the fact that the
person happens to be a woman or happens to be a man. Id. at 146. Then the Court, quoting
Batson, stated “[a]s with race, the ‘core guarantee of equal protection, ensuring citizens that
their State will not discriminate . . . , would be meaningless were we to approve the exclusion
of jurors on the basis of such assumptions, which arise solely from the juror’s [gender].’” Id.
at 146 (quoting Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97–98 (1986)). See DRESSLER & MICHAELS,
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In SmithKline Beecham Corporation (“GSK”) v. Abbott Laboratories, Abbot
Laboratories, an HIV drug manufacturer, allegedly violated the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, antitrust laws, and the North
Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act.89 During voir dire, the defense used
its first peremptory strike against the only self-identified gay member of
the venire.90 GSK challenged the strike arguing it was based on the
individual’s sexual orientation.91 The district court judge denied the
challenge and removed the individual from the jury pool.92 On appeal,
the Ninth Circuit adopted a step-by-step approach under Batson’s three
part inquiry.93 First, the court determined that GSK established a prima

supra note 43, at 233 (“[T]he Court held that ‘the Equal Protection Clause prohibits
discrimination in jury selection on the basis of gender, or on the assumption that an
individual will be biased in a particular case for no reason other than the fact that the person
happens to be a woman or happens to be a man . . . .’”).
89
740 F.3d 471, 474 (9th Cir. 2014). See SmithKline Beecham Corporation, DBA
GlaxoSmithKline v. Abbott Laboratories, 740 .F.3d 471 (9th Cir. 2014), THE CTR. FOR HIV LAW
& POLICY (Mar. 2014), http://www.hivlawandpolicy.org/resources/smithkline-beechamcorporation-dba-glaxosmithkline-v-abbott-laboratories-740-f3d-471-9th
[http://perma.cc/XUN8-QCRL] (describing the case as one that arose from a licensing
agreement and the pricing of HIV medications).
90
GSK, 740 F.3d at 474. See Shmuel Bushwick, Excluding Gay Jurors After Windsor, ABA
(Nov. 7, 2013), http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/lgbt/articles/fall20131113-excluding-gay-jurors-after-windsor.html [http://perma.cc/BT3S-HTCU] (reviewing
the pretext of the GSK case). Following Abbott’s peremptory strike, GSK objected claiming
Abbott violated Batson by basing the peremptory strike on the juror’s answers during voir
dire, which identified him as gay. Id.
91
GSK, 740 F.3d at 474. See Will Batson Challenges Extended to Sexual Orientation?,
COURTROOM LOGIC (Feb. 3, 2014), http://courtroomlogic.com/2014/02/03/batsonchallenges-and-sexual-orientation [http://perma.cc/9GHD-B844] (providing the excused
juror’s responses during voir dire questioning). The male venire member, Juror B, referenced
“my partner” and “he” multiple times during voir dire questioning. Id. Further, Juror B
openly identified himself as a gay man. Id.
92
GSK, 740 F.3d at 474.
93
See id. at 476 (discussing the first step in determining whether Abbott’s peremptory
strike was purposeful discrimination in establishing a prima facie case). The court found
that GSK had established a prima facie case of intentional discrimination for several reasons,
including the fact that the peremptory strike was used on the only self-identified gay
member of the venire in a case where the subject matter is an issue of consequence to the gay
community. Id. In addition, the court explained that there is reason to infer that Abbott used
its peremptory strike to remove the potential juror on the basis of his sexual orientation
because of its “fear that he would be influenced by concern in the gay community over
Abbott’s decision to increase the price of its HIV drug.” Id. The court noted that in Johnson
v. Campbell, it found it significant that the struck juror’s sexual orientation had no relevance
to the subject matter of the litigation, whereas here, the facts of the case made it clear there
was a significant impact on the gay community. Id. (citing 92 F.3d 951 (9th Cir. 1996)). On
review of these facts and determinations, the court found that viewing the totality of the
circumstances, there was no difficulty in finding GSK raised an inference of discrimination
and established a prima facie case. Id.
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facie case of intentional discrimination.94 Second, the court reviewed the
defense’s response to GSK’s claim of intentional discrimination. 95 Finally,
the court reviewed the record and held that the district judge failed to
correctly apply the law.96 Judge Reinhardt found that all three prongs of
Batson were satisfied and evaluated “the fundamental legal question
before [the court]: whether Batson prohibits strikes based on sexual
orientation.”97 The court held that sexual orientation is subject to
heightened scrutiny and Batson applies to peremptory strikes on that
basis.98
B. Transgender and the Discrimination of that Class
The courts considered the history of discrimination against racial
minorities, women, and sexual orientation in its decision to expand

See GSK, 470 F.3d at 476 (stating that GSK satisfied the first step of Batson by establishing
a prima facie case of intentional discrimination). The court noted that the individual who
was the subject of the peremptory challenge was the only member of the venire who was
openly gay. Id. Moreover, the court pointed to the fact that “[w]hen jury pools contain little
racial or ethnic diversity, we have held that a strike of the lone member of the minority group
is a ‘relevant consideration’ in determining whether a prima facie case has been established.”
Id.
95
See id. at 477 (reviewing Abbott’s decline to provide any justification for its strike when
given the opportunity to do so by the district court). The court navigates the discussion that
occurred between the district judge and Abbott’s counsel, specifically noting that the judge
indicated she might reject the Batson challenge on legal grounds and Abbott’s counsel could
adopt those grounds, but she advised him that “it might be the better part of valor” to
identify the basis for the strike. Id. Abbott’s counsel responded that he would simply rely
on the grounds given by the judge. Id.
96
See GSK, 740 F.3d at 478 (explaining that the district judge incorrectly applied the law
to the Batson challenge). The court reviewed the three step test required by Batson and stated
that because GSK had correctly established a prima facie case of intentional discrimination
and Abbott offered no reason for the strike, the record clearly and persuasively demonstrates
that the potential juror was struck because he was gay. Id. at 479. Moreover, the court found
that it may perform the third step of the Batson challenge and conclude “even based on a
‘cold record,’ that [Abbott’s] stated reasons for striking [Juror B] was a pretext for purposeful
discrimination.” Id. at 479 (quoting United States v. Alanis, 335 F.3d 965, 969 n.5 (9th Cir.
2003)).
97
Id. at 479.
98
See id. at 480–84 (explaining that on review of United States v. Windsor, sexual orientation
is entitled to heightened scrutiny). The court begins by stating that Windsor did not expressly
state which level of scrutiny it applied to the equal protection claim that was at issue in that
case, but under Witt v. Department of the Air Force, it is aware of how to resolve the issue. Id.
at 480 (citing 527 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 2008)). Specifically, the court analyzes Supreme Court
precedent “by considering what the Court actually did, rather than by dissecting isolated
pieces of text.” GSK, 740 F.3d at 480 (quoting Witt, 527 F.3d at 816). Applying the same
analysis in Witt, as well as the analytical framework of Windsor, the court found that
heightened scrutiny should be applied to equal protection claims involving sexual
orientation. Id. at 484.
94
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Batson.99 During voir dire, these minorities are entitled to protective
measures.100 Unlike those in Batson and its progeny, transgender
individuals are not afforded the same judicial protection in the jury
selection process.101 However, these individuals have endured the same
intolerable treatment for an extended period of time. 102 This Part of the
Note defines what it means to be transgender and discusses the type of
discrimination transgender individuals face. 103
1.

Defining Transgender

The term transgender describes an individual who is born as one sex,
but identifies as another.104 According to the American Civil Liberties
Union handbook, transgender is defined as an:
[U]mbrella term used to describe a range of identities and
experiences, including but not limited to preoperative,
postoperative, and nonoperative transsexual people;
male and female cross-dressers; intersex individuals; and
men and women, regardless of their sexual orientation,
whose appearance, behavior, or characteristics are
perceived to be different than that stereotypically
associated with their sex assigned at birth. 105

See supra Part II.A.2–3 (discussing factors considered by the courts when deciding
whether to expand Batson).
100
See supra Part II.A.2–3 (explaining how voir dire applies in situations where members
of the venire are discriminated against based solely on their race, gender, or sexual
orientation).
101
See infra Part II.B.1 (showing that the law excludes transgender from Batson challenges).
102
See infra Part II.B.2 (outlining the discrimination toward transgender individuals).
103
See infra Part II.B (defining transgender and providing examples of situations and
scenarios where transgender individuals are discriminated against).
104
See Holly V. Franson, The Rise of the Transgender Child: Overcoming Societal Stigma,
Institutional Discrimination, and Individual Bias to Enact and Enforce Nondiscriminatory Dress
Code Policies, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 497, 500 (2013) (providing various definitions, but
concluding the term transgender is difficult to define). Transgender can be defined as
including individuals who do not conform to traditional gender norms and stereotypes. Id.
See also Phyllis Randolph Frye, The International Bill of Gender Rights vs. the Cider House Rules:
Transgenders Struggle with the Court Over What Clothing They are Allowed to Wear on the Job,
Which Restroom They are Allowed to Use on the Job, Their Right to Marry, and the Very Definition
of Their Sex, 7 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 133, 153 (2000) (explaining that transgender is an
umbrella term and terms such as cross-dresser, transvestite, and transsexual are subsets of
the umbrella term). While transgender serves as an umbrella term, the focus of this Note is
on individuals who identify as transgender either pre or post operation.
105
NAN D. HUNTER ET AL., THE RIGHTS OF LESBIANS, GAY MEN, BISEXUALS, AND
TRANSGENDER PEOPLE 172 (2004).
99
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The term transgender is similar to gender variant and gender
nonconforming.106 Although transgender and sexual orientation appear
to be coupled because they are merged into the common acronym
“LGBTQ,” which stands for lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, or queer,
they are not representative of the same thing.107 Transgender correlates to
the individual’s gender identification, whereas sexual orientation deals
with an individual’s sexual preference.108 Identity is not equivalent to
preference; therefore transgender cannot mean the same thing as sexual
orientation.109 Moreover, identifying as transgender does not inherently
See id. (noting that gender variant and gender nonconforming are other terms used as
synonyms for transgender). See also Franson, supra note 104, at 500 (explaining that there is
no accepted or concrete definition for the term “transgender”) (quoting Diana Elkind, The
Constitutional Implications of Bathroom Access Based on Gender Identity: An Examination of Recent
Developments Paving the Way for the Next Frontier of Equal Protection, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 895,
897–98 (2007)). Franson goes on to state that according to scholars, transgender includes a
variety of people who do not conform to stereotypes and traditional gender norms. Id. See
Phyllis Randolph Frye & Katrina C. Rose, Responsible Representation of Your First
Transgendered Client, 66 TEX. B.J. 558, 558 (2003) (defining transgender as an umbrella term
that encompasses all forms “of being at odds with ‘traditional’ concepts of gender”).
Transsexual is defined as “[a] person who desires to change bodily sex characteristics,
irrespective of whether the person has undergone, or intends to undergo, corrective genital
reconstructive surgery (CGRS), also referred to as sex reassignment surgery (SRS).” Id. at
558–59. Intersex is defined as “[p]ersons who were born with mutated, incomplete, or dual
genitals; with chromosomal patterns other than XX or XY; or whose gender identity
development was affected in some manner by pre-natal hormonal imbalances.” Id. at 559.
The focus of this Note is specifically on transgender and will address only that term.
107
See Alexis Forbes, A (Short) Primer on Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, and Queer
(LGBTQ) Culture in America, THE JURY EXPERT (Feb. 6, 2014), http://www.thejury
expert.com/2014/02/a-short-primer-on-lesbian-gay-bisexual-transgender-and-queer-lgbtq
-culture-in-america/ [http://perma.cc/6BFP-VCU8] (differentiating transgender from
sexual orientation, specifically lesbian, gay, and bisexual). “Transgender studies and
advocacy is incorporated into LGBQ (lesbian, gay, bisexual, and queer) issues because
transgender people experience similar stigmas and discriminatory experiences to what
lesbians, gay men, bisexual men and women, and queer individuals encounter.” Id. See also
Ami B. Kaplan, What Is the Difference Between Gay and Transgender?, TRANSGENDER MENTAL
HEALTH,
http://tgmentalhealth.com/2012/10/26/what-is-the-difference-between-gayand-transgender/#comments [http://perma.cc/S2E6-6X9B] (identifying differences
between gays and transgender). Gay refers to “who you are attracted to” whereas
transgender “has to do with one’s gender identity.” Id. The former deals with your attraction
and the latter deals with your identity. Id.
108
See Answers to Your Questions About Transgender People, Gender Identity, and Gender
Expression, AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N (2011) (describing the difference between sexual orientation
and gender identity) [hereinafter Answers to Your Questions]. Sexual orientation differs from
gender identity because the former deals with “an individual’s enduring physical, romantic,
and/or emotional attraction to another person” and the latter deals with the individual’s
“internal sense of being male, female, or something else.” Id. See also Forbes, supra note 107
(stating that the term transgender does not provide any information as to the individual’s
sexual orientation).
109
See Discrimination Against Transgender People, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION 1 (2014),
https://www.aclu.org/lgbt-rights/discrimination-against-transgender-people
106
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mean an individual is homosexual.110 Transgender individuals can be
gay, straight, or bisexual.111 Being transgender means an individual may
be biologically born as a male, but identifies as a female.112 The same can
be true for an individual born as a biological female who identifies as a
male.113
For these individuals, surgical procedures and medical

[http://perma.cc/JQ5M-HWQF] (discussing that although transgender and sexual
orientation are similar in that both generally face the same types of discrimination, those that
identify as transgender often encounter more severe forms of discrimination). Because
transgender individuals have issues with areas of the law that do not impact those of sexual
orientation, they are distinct. Id. For example, transgender individuals face issues with
identity documents that do not reflect the gender they identify with, sex-segregated public
restrooms, dress codes that perpetuate traditional gender norms, and barriers on access to
health care. Id.
110
See Forbes, supra note 107 (illustrating that a transgender individual can be
heterosexual, homosexual, or bisexual). Because being transgender correlates to a different
gender identity than that assigned at birth, a transgender person may be attracted to
someone of the same sex with which they were biologically born. Id. However, because the
transgender person does not identify with their biologically assigned sex, the attraction is
heterosexual. Id. For example, if a biological transgender female identifies throughout her
entire life as a male and is attracted to a female, that represents a heterosexual classification
rather than a homosexual classification. Id.
111
See id. (noting that a transgender individual may identify as gay, lesbian, bisexual,
asexual, pansexual, and/or heterosexual). Forbes states, “[i]t is not their sexual orientation,
but the discrepancy between their gender identity and their sex that defines their
transgender identity.” Id. See also Joanne Herman, Some Transgender People are Not Gay, HUFF.
POST (June 30, 2011, 10:31 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/joanne-herman/sometransgender-people-a_b_886692.html [http://perma.cc/24AV-Y74X] (addressing the
common misconception that all transgender individuals are gay). In 1990, lesbian and gay
organizations started to include transgender in their missions. Id. The inclusion of
transgender led many to believe that it was simply an extension of gay and lesbian, but
transgender does not mean gay and gay does not represent transgender. Id. Herman
illustrates her point by referencing Chaz Bono, who was born the daughter of Cher and Sony
Bono, and came out as a lesbian in 1995. Id. It was not until 2008 that Chaz realized he was
not a lesbian, but a man who was attracted to women. Id. Chaz, who is in a relationship
with a female, is considered by society to be a heterosexual man. Id.
112
See HUNTER ET AL., supra note 105, at 172 (explaining that female-to-male transsexual
(“FTM”) persons are born with female bodies but have a strong male gender identity and
male-to-female transsexual (“MTF”) people are born with male bodies but have a female
gender identity); see also Forbes, supra note 107 (discussing that like those individuals with
an intersex gender identity, individuals with a queer gender identity believe that neither
male nor female describe their gender self-concept). Persons with a queer gender identity
believe that the “binary conceptualization of gender” inaccurately describes their identity.
Forbes, supra note 107. Queer gender identity differs from intersex in that those individuals
were born with the reproductive anatomy of only one sex, but identify with another sex. Id.
Intersex individuals are born with both male and female sex characteristics. Id. This Note
will not address queer gender identity.
113
See HUNTER ET AL., supra note 105, at 172 (elaborating on gender identity of transgender
individuals).
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treatments are available to aid in the transition process.114 However, not
all transgender individuals pursue a permanent sex change.115 For
example, an individual may alter their appearance through clothing,
hairstyle, cosmetics, and other temporary lifestyle changes.116 As it
pertains to discrimination, advocacy for transgender individuals is
frequently coupled with lesbians, gays, and bisexuals. 117 Although each
classification faces similar forms of discrimination and prejudice, this
Note focuses on the discrimination of transgender individuals.118
2.

Discrimination of Transgender Individuals

Society is hardly deterred from discriminating against an
individual—transgender individuals find no exception to this
statement.119 For example, according to the National Transgender
Discrimination Survey, fifty percent of transgender individuals who

See id. (stating a majority of transsexual individuals, FTM and MTF, seek medical
treatment to change their physical sex). Medical treatment can include hormone therapy and
sex-reassignment surgery. Id. See also Answers to Your Questions, supra note 108 (explaining
that the transitioning process for transsexuals is complex). First, trans individuals generally
start with living day-to-day as a member of their preferred gender. Id. Next, the person
might adopt common social changes that relate to the gender they identify with. Id.
115
See JAIME M. GRANT ET AL., NATIONAL TRANSGENDER DISCRIMINATION SURVEY REPORT
ON
HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE 3 (2010), http://transequality.org/PDFs/
NTDSReportonHealth_final.pdf [http://perma.cc/CG5U-4GVN] (“Transition is a process
that some, but not all, transgender and gender non-conforming people undertake to live as
a gender different from the one they were assigned at birth.”).
116
See id. (explaining that some transgender individuals transition through means such as
appearance). Transgender individuals may take on the appearance of the gender they feel
they should have been assigned. Id. Specifically, the transgender person might make
changes in clothing and grooming, their name, or even change, if possible, their sex
designation on identity documents. Id. See also Forbes, supra note 107 (discussing how
transgender people often encounter emotional distress if their appearance does not line up
with their self-identified gender). For example, some transgender individuals will change
their clothing, physical form, and facial features. Id. In addition, the transgender individual
may undergo behavioral treatments, such as cadence, posture, or speech lessons to aid the
individual in enhancing their self-identified gender appropriately. Id.
117
See Forbes, supra note 107 (noting that transgender advocacy is incorporated into
lesbian, gay, bisexual, and queer or LGBQ, because transgender people experience similar
stigmas and discrimination to what lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and queer individuals
encounter).
118
See infra Part III.C (distinguishing transgender from sexual orientation and arguing
Batson should be applicable to the former like it is to the latter).
119
See Carolyn E. Coffey, Battling Gender Orthodoxy: Prohibiting Discrimination on the Basis
of Gender Identity and Expression in the Court and in the Legislatures, 7 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 161, 164
(2004) (stating that transgender individuals face several forms of discrimination in nearly all
areas of life).
114
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openly disclose themselves as transgender attempt suicide.120 Educational
facilities, places of employment, prisons, and even health care forums
make up a small number of arenas where transgender discrimination
occurs.121 In schools, transgender students encounter bullying and
harassment.122 Eighty-two percent of transgender youth report feeling
unsafe in schools and forty-four percent of those students report being
bullied in schools.123 In addition, places of employment host a
considerable number of discriminatory behaviors and offenses toward
transgender people.124 Examples of discrimination in the work place
See ANN P. HAAS ET AL., Suicide Attempts Among Transgender and Gender Non-conforming
Adults, NAT’L TRANSGENDER DISCRIMINATION SURVEY 2 (2014), http://williams
institute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/AFSP-Williams-Suicide-Report-Final.pdf
[http://perma.cc/XT6D-G4XF] (providing statistics for suicide attempts among transgender
individuals).
121
See Coffey, supra note 119, at 165 (identifying schools and workplaces as common arenas
for transgender discrimination). See also Answers to Your Questions, supra note 108 (explaining
that transgender people face discrimination in most cities and states in nearly every aspect
of their lives). According to the National Center for Transgender Equality and the National
Gay and Lesbian Task Force, out of a sample of 6500 transgender people, the highest level of
discrimination was experienced in employment, housing, health care, education, legal
systems, and their families. Id. at 3–4. See also Know Your Rights—Transgender People and the
Law, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION (Apr. 24, 2013), https://www.aclu.org/lgbt-rights/knowyour-rights-transgender-people-and-law
[http://perma.cc/H4NC-FSVH]
(discussing
transgender rights in prison) [hereinafter Know Your Rights]. A majority of prisons house
transgender inmates in cellblocks that correspond with their biologically assigned gender.
Id. Because prisons are somewhat in fear of being held liable in the event the transgender
person is raped or endures other forms of abuse, prisons are developing more respectful
housing policies. Id.
122
See Devi M. Rao, Gender Identity Discrimination Is Sex Discrimination: Protecting
Transgender Students From Bullying and Harassment Using Title IX, 28 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y
245, 246 (2013) (identifying ongoing bullying of transgender students at schools); see also
Know Your Rights, supra note 121 (discussing that several, but not all, states prohibit gender
identity discrimination in public schools by issuing regulations or guidance clarifying what
a school must do to accommodate the transgender student).
123
See Transgender Bullying:
A National Epidemic, NOBULLYING (July 13, 2014),
http://nobullying.com/transgender-bullying/ [http://perma.cc/F5R8-ABWS] (providing
transgender bullying statistics). In addition to being bullied in schools, transgender students
are often victims of cyber bullying. Id. Moreover, transgender youth who experience high
feelings of rejection are “[a]bout six times more likely to be seriously depressed, [m]ore than
eight times more likely to attempt suicide, [m]ore than three times more likely to abuse illegal
drugs, [and] [m]ore than three times more likely to engage in risky sexual behavior.” Id.
124
See Frye & Rose, supra note 106, at 559 (explaining that most employers do not provide
protection to transgender people). See also Coffey, supra note 119, at 165 (discussing
transgender discrimination in the workplace). Discrimination in the workplace typically is
comprised of “harassment in the form of offensive or intimidating behavior by co-workers
or supervisors, not addressing [the individual] by her or his chosen name or pronoun,
refusing to allow the person to use the appropriate bathroom, and asking offensive questions
about [the individual’s] medical history or genitalia.” Id.; Employment Law Alert: Transgender
Employees Protected Under Title VII, STOEL RIVES LLP (Apr. 24, 2012), http://www.stoel.com/
120

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2016

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 50, No. 3 [2016], Art. 7

742

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50

include inappropriate and offensive language and denying the individual
from using the restroom designated with the sex identified by the
individual.125 Although the amount and severity of the discrimination
may vary with the specific type of work, the presence of discrimination is
still significant.126 Moreover, those who identify as transgender encounter
unjust treatment in prisons.127 For example, transgender inmates are often
housed in the homosexual block of the inmate populations without regard

showalert.aspx?Show=9446 [http://perma.cc/TR9C-CQLB] (announcing the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission’s (“EEOC”) landmark decision that “intentional
discrimination against a transgender individual is discrimination ‘based on . . . sex’ and thus
violates Title VII”). The EEOC ruling resulted after a transgender woman was denied a
position with the Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (“ATF”).
Employment Law Alert, supra note 124. The woman’s complaint was based on “gender
identity” and “sex stereotyping.” Id. Initially, the EEOC declined to process the claim citing
lack of jurisdiction, however on appeal, the EEOC ruled “when an employer discriminates
against someone because the person is transgender, the employer has engaged in disparate
treatment ‘related to the sex of the victim.’” Id. Prior to this ruling, the EEOC usually
declined to pursue discrimination claims that arose from transgender status or gender
identity. Id.
125
See Coffey, supra note 119, at 165 (discussing the discrimination of transgender
employees in the workplace). See also Jason Lee, Lost in Transition: The Challenges of
Remedying Transgender Employment Discrimination Under Title VII, 35 HARV. J.L. & GENDER
423, 424 (2012) (noting that transgender individuals continue to face “intense, pervasive
discrimination in the employment context”). Statistics from a national survey of
approximately 6500 transgender individuals show that almost half of the respondents
experienced an adverse employment action, including “denial of a job, denial of a promotion,
or termination of employment.” Id. (citing JAIME M. GRANT ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR
TRANSGENDER EQUAL. AND NAT’L GAY AND LESBIAN TASK FORCE, INJUSTICE AT EVERY TURN:
A REPORT OF THE NAT’L TRANSGENDER DISCRIMINATION SURVEY 53 (2011),
http://www.thetaskforce.org/static_html/downloads/release_materials/injustice_latino_
englishversion.pdf [http://perma.cc/A5X3-E66L]).
126
See Coffey, supra note 119, at 165 (identifying several accounts of transgender people
losing their jobs as a result of their status). See generally Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d
1081, 1087 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1017 (1985) (ruling Title VII does not protect
transsexuals and even if transsexual was considered female, the trial judge made no factual
findings necessary to support the conclusion that the employer discriminated against her on
this basis); Sommers v. Budget Marketing, Inc., 667 F.2d 748, 750 (8th Cir. 1982) (finding the
word “sex” in the Title VII ban on sex discrimination in employment is to have plain meaning
and does not encompass discrimination based on transsexualism); Holloway v. Arthur
Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 664 (9th Cir. 1977) (holding Title VII does not prohibit the
discharge of an employee for undergoing the process of sex transformation, persons who
undergo medical procedures to change their sex are not a “suspect class” for purposes of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and the discharge of an employee for undergoing sex change
procedures did not violate the doctrines of due process and equal protection).
127
See Gabriel Arkles, Safety and Solidarity Across Gender Lines: Rethinking Segregation of
Transgender People in Detention, 18 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 515, 516 (2008) (discussing
safety concerns for incarcerated transgender individuals and the violence they face while
behind bars).
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to the individual’s safety.128 Health care is another area where a
transgender person will likely face discrimination. 129 For example,
Medicaid is often difficult to obtain to cover the medical expenses related
to surgical procedures for gender reassignment. 130 Discrimination of
transgender individuals expands beyond the examples put forth here,
which is why judicial support and recognition of the issue should be
addressed.
III. ANALYSIS
Batson paved the way for analyzing potential peremptory challenges
on the basis of racial discrimination.131 Since the 1986 decision, Batson has
extended to discrimination on the basis of gender and sexual
orientation.132 While the Ninth Circuit determined that discrimination
See Frye & Rose, supra note 106, at 561 (explaining that transgender people are “often
classified and kept in the homosexual areas of the inmate populations”). Because there is an
increased danger of rape and assault, transgender individuals should be housed separately
for their own safety. Id. See also HUNTER ET AL., supra note 105, at 181 (noting that transgender
and transsexual people who have not had genital surgery are classified according to their
birth sex for purposes of housing them in prison). Because of the great risk of sexual violence
toward transgender and transsexual inmates, some prisons have implemented a “solution”
which entails segregating transgender and transsexual inmates. Id. The segregation
provides greater protection to the prison, but it also results in the exclusion of the inmate
from obtaining full access to things like recreation, educational and occupational
opportunities, and associational rights. Id.
129
See Lisa Gillespie, Transgender People Still Have Trouble Getting Some Health Care, ST.
LOUIS TODAY (July 22, 2015), http://www.stltoday.com/lifestyles/health-medfit/transgender-people-still-have-trouble-getting-some-health-care/article_439733c4-9fac5cd8-89ab-1381e7f8fa19.html [http://perma.cc/48U9-5CXU] (explaining the challenge of
obtaining health care coverage for a transgender individual); see also Discrimination Against
Transgender People, supra note 109 (stating that transgender people face difficulties meeting
their basic needs, such as obtaining health care); Know Your Rights, supra note 121 (explaining
that health care coverage is difficult to obtain for transgender people).
130
See Know Your Rights, supra note 121 (noting that Medicaid and Medicare traditionally
have not covered gender reassignment procedures). Currently, the law does not provide
much information about the insurance companies denying coverage to transgender
individuals for routine medical treatment. Id.
131
See supra Part II.A.2 (discussing the Batson decision and the Court’s determination that
peremptory challenges motivated by race are discriminatory).
132
See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 100 (1986) (holding race as motivation for a
peremptory challenge is discriminatory). Batson was the first case to determine that a
peremptory challenge based on race was discriminatory and in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause. Id. at 84, 100. This case established the analytical framework for a Batson
challenge, which requires a three step process of determining whether the challenge was
discriminatory. Id. at 93–98. See also J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 129 (1994)
(finding a peremptory challenge based on gender is discriminatory and subject to a Batson
challenge); SmithKline Beecham Corp. (“GSK”) v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471, 489 (9th Cir.
2014) (establishing that Batson is proper where sexual orientation is the basis for a
peremptory challenge); IRINA Y. DMITRIEVA, BATSON CHALLENGES IN CIVIL LITIGATION: THE
128
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aimed at lesbians and gays during voir dire now requires a thorough
analysis under Batson, the same judicial review is not extended to
transgender individuals.133 As transgender becomes a more prevalent
group in society with increased awareness and understanding, they too
should be protected under Batson.134
This Note analyzes the expansion of Batson to sexual orientation and
examines transgender individuals in the judiciary, ultimately conceding
that Batson should again be expanded to protect transgender
individuals.135 First, Part III.A evaluates the analytical framework of
Batson as applied to sexual orientation.136 Second, Part III.B analyzes how
transgender individuals are perceived in the judiciary and the need for
judicial involvement.137 Third, Part III.C distinguishes transgender from
sexual orientation for the purpose of demonstrating the former is not
currently protected under Batson.138 Finally, Part III.D proposes that
Batson be expanded to include transgender individuals to ensure equal
protection during voir dire.139

UNDERESTIMATED POTENTIAL (2011) (reviewing the three step process established in the
Batson decision). GSK thus far is the only court to extend Batson to sexual orientation. 740
F.3d at 489.
133
See GSK, 740 F.3d at 489 (announcing the expansion of Batson on the basis of sexual
orientation, specifically as it defines gays and lesbians). See also Discrimination Against LGBT
Jurors Remains Legal, THE AM. INDEPENDENT (May 1, 2012, 8:18 AM),
http://americanindependent.com/215836/discrimination-against-lgbt-jurors-remainslegal [http://perma.cc/HFV2-8TJU] (outlining incidents in which members of the LGBT
community have faced discrimination in the courtroom). One incident of discrimination
involved a potential juror, Steve Grandell, who was dismissed from a trial in Hennepin
County District Court in Minnesota. Id. Grandell was struck from the jury when the assistant
district attorney exercised a peremptory challenge because “Grandell appeared to be a man
dressed as a woman.” Id. Grandell identified as transgender. Id. The defense attorney
objected to the peremptory, but the judge overruled the objection. Id. Grandell later told the
Star Tribune that he believed he was dismissed “not only because of his style but because
the case that was being heard involves sexual assault between an adult and a minor.” Id.
Grandell stated that transgender people “are always lumped in with sexual deviants.”
Discrimination Against LGBT Jurors Remains Legal, supra note 133.
134
See infra Part III.D (urging the expansion of Batson to transgender individuals).
135
See infra Part III.A–D (discussing the expansion of Batson to sexual orientation and
evaluating the need for judicial involvement with regard to transgender individuals as well
as distinguishing sexual orientation from transgender).
136
See infra Part III.A (imploring the acceptance of the decision to extend Batson to sexual
orientation).
137
See infra Part III.B (articulating factors that should be considered by the judicial system
in its recognition and identification of transgender and explaining why judicial involvement
is necessary).
138
See infra Part III.C (distinguishing sexual orientation from transgender).
139
See infra Part III.D (proposing the expansion of Batson to include transgender
individuals, following the expansion to sexual orientation, which is necessary to ensure
equal protection during voir dire).
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A. Batson Expanded to Sexual Orientation
In 2014, the Ninth Circuit made the bold decision to extend Batson to
sexual orientation.140 This extension is likely to be controversial and
widely disputed.141 However, such contentions are misplaced, as sexual
orientation is a class that warrants protection under Batson.142 Part III.A.1
evaluates the three step test established in Batson and how it was correctly
applied to sexual orientation.143 Part III.A.2 examines the Ninth Circuit’s
determination under United States v. Windsor, that sexual orientation is a
classification requiring a heightened level of scrutiny.144
1.

A Batson Challenge is Appropriate for Sexual Orientation

Sexual orientation should be entitled to a Batson challenge.145 GSK
must establish a prima facie case of intentional discrimination because
GSK challenged the defense’s first peremptory strike against the only selfidentified gay member of the venire.146 The strike would be dismissed if
GSK failed to demonstrate Abbott’s strike was motivated by purposeful
discrimination.147 Generally, a minority is facially recognizable thus
See supra Part II.A.3 (discussing the Ninth Circuit’s decision to extend Batson to include
sexual orientation).
141
See infra Part III.D.2 (addressing criticism of the court’s extension of Batson to cover
sexual orientation).
142
See infra Part III.D.2 (establishing criticism of Batson and the Ninth Circuit’s decision to
expand its protections is misguided).
143
See infra Part III.A.1 (reviewing each step of Batson as the Ninth Circuit applied the
challenge to sexual orientation).
144
See infra Part III.A.2 (examining how the Ninth Circuit determined sexual orientation
was subject to a heightened level of scrutiny upon review of Windsor).
145
See SmithKline Beecham Corp. (“GSK”) v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471, 485 (9th Cir. 2014)
(articulating that peremptory strikes based on sexual orientation advance a “deplorable
tradition” of unequal treatment). The court outlined a brief history of the treatment received
by gays and lesbians in our society and noted they have been “systematically excluded from
the most important institutions of self-governance.” Id. at 484. Moreover, the court
acknowledged that even in “prior cases that rejected applying heightened scrutiny to
classifications on the basis of sexual orientation . . . gay and lesbian individuals have
experienced significant discrimination.” Id. (citing High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec.
Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 573 (9th Cir. 1990)).
146
Id. at 476. GSK made the challenge against Abbott following Abbott’s strike of the only
self-identified gay member of the venire. Id. Because GSK made the challenge, they were
required to “produce evidence that 1) the prospective juror is a member of a cognizable
group; 2) counsel used a peremptory strike against the individual; and 3) ‘the totality of the
circumstances raises an inference that the strike was motivated’ by the characteristic in
question.” Id.
147
See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96 (1986) (stating the establishment of a prima facie
case is first necessary to demonstrate a strike was discriminatory after which the burden
shifts to the opposing side). See also Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 222 (1965) (establishing
the standard for assessing a prima facie case). Because the challenger is first required to
140
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creating a greater likelihood of establishing a prima facie case of
intentional discrimination.148
However, transgender, like sexual
orientation, is often not facially neutral.149 Batson should require the
challenging party to articulate why the individual is part of a protected
class that is typically prone to discrimination.150
Furthermore, because sexual orientation is a controversial subject, the
second step of a Batson challenge is necessary to allow counsel the
opportunity to defend the peremptory strike and ultimately any
assumption of personal bias.151 When an action is taken in a light
unfavorable to a homosexual individual, the presumption exists that the
action was prejudicially motivated. 152
Ultimately, because sexual
orientation often triggers opposing opinions and beliefs, the court should

establish a prima facie case of intentional discrimination before the burden shifts to the
opposing side, it is understood that if the challenger fails to prove a prima facie case then the
burden will not shift and the challenge becomes moot. Id.
148
See Cintas, Minority Classifications, http://www.cintas.com/company/supplier_
diversity_requirements.pdf [http://perma.cc/AG4V-SK25] (defining minority as a person
who is “a citizen of the United States who is African American, Hispanic, Native American,
Asian Pacific, or Asian Indian”). These groups of minorities are more likely to be facially
recognizable because their classification as a minority is based on racial or ethnic features,
whereas minorities such as homosexuals are not facially identifiable. Id.; see also
Discrimination Against LGBT Juror Remains Legal, supra note 133 (discussing issues with
identification of gays and lesbians, specifically because an attorney cannot ask an individual
if they are homosexual).
149
See Forbes, supra note 107 (explaining similarities between sexual orientation and
transgender and the identification of each).
150
See Kathryn Ann Barry, Striking Back Against Homophobia: Prohibiting Peremptory Strikes
Based on Sexual Orientation, 16 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 157, 157 (2001) (providing
support for the expansion of Batson to peremptory challenges on the basis of sexual
orientation because issues with homophobia on juries may be improved).
151
See Giovanna Shay, In The Box: Voir Dire on LGBT Issues in Changing Times, 37 HARV.
J.L. & GENDER 407, 407 (2014) (explaining ongoing issues with sexual orientation during voir
dire and suggesting that intervention is necessary). Shay’s review and examination of
transcripts, court filings, and published opinions about jury voir dire on attitudes toward
same-sex sexuality and LGBT issues demonstrates that “jurors express a range of
homonegative attitudes.” Id.
152
See Discrimination Against LGBT Jurors Remains Legal, supra note 133 (considering the
trial of Harvey Milk in which Dan White’s defense attorney excluded gay and lesbian
individuals from the jury inferring the exclusion was discriminatorily motivated). The 1978
trial of Dan White, the man charged with the murder of Harvey Milk, a gay San Francisco
city supervisor, included “[d]eliberate efforts” by White’s attorneys to exclude lesbians and
gays from the jury. Id. The judge informed the attorneys they could not ask the potential
jurors their sexual orientation, but the attorneys still attained their objective of a heterosexual
jury. Id. White’s attorneys posed questions such as, “Have you ever supported controversial
causes, like homosexual rights, for instance?” Id. One member of the venire was further
questioned by White’s attorneys regarding his “roommate.” Id.
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be the final party to review the record and rule on the matter. 153 Since
judges are removed from the situation, they are in the best position to
provide neutrality when considering the appropriateness of a Batson
challenge.154 Therefore, the three step analysis under Batson is both
necessary and appropriate as applied to sexual orientation. 155
2.

The Ninth Circuit’s Examination of United States v. Windsor

Juror disqualification based solely on an individual’s sexual
orientation is highly susceptible to inequality and discrimination, thus a
heightened level of scrutiny is the proper standard to apply. 156 Since the

See Protected and Served?, LAMBDA LEGAL, http://www.lambdalegal.org/protectedand-served-courts [http://perma.cc/W64M-FKPU] (reviewing the ongoing bias and
negative treatment of LGBT individuals in the courtroom). Anti-LGBT beliefs and opinions
are apparent in various environments, but because they are frequently noticed in a
courtroom, judges must intervene with neutrality. Id.
154
See Bushwick, supra note 90 (explaining it was not until GSK that a federal court finally
recognized sexual orientation as being protected under Batson against peremptory strikes).
See generally J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 146 (1994) (holding peremptory
challenges premised on gender are discriminatory and subject to a Batson challenge); Batson
v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 100 (1986) (ruling peremptory challenges exercised on the basis of
race are discriminatory); Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 227–28 (1965) (holding a
peremptory challenge against an African American man, absent a sufficient showing of a
prosecutor’s participation in ongoing exclusion of African Americans from juries, does not
give rise to an inference of systematic discrimination); SmithKline Beecham Corp. (“GSK”)
v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471, 489 (9th Cir. 2014) (extending Batson to peremptory challenges
based on sexual orientation); United States v. Osazuwa, 446 F. App’x 919, 920 (9th Cir. 2011)
(affirming the trial court’s decision to deny the claimant’s motion under Batson to prevent
the government from exercising a peremptory challenge against a potential juror on the basis
of her sexual orientation); United States v. Blaylock, 421 F.3d 758, 769–70 (8th Cir. 2005)
(deciding the trial court’s decision to deny a Batson challenge to the government’s
peremptory strike of a panel member, even if the defendant made a prima facie case of
purposeful discrimination on basis of sexual orientation, was not an error); Johnson v.
Campbell, 92 F.3d 951, 954 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding that allegations that challenged whether
a juror was gay did not establish a prima facie case or purposeful discrimination, even if
sexual orientation is a protected classification under Batson). Johnson, Blaylock, and Osazuwa
were three cases prior to GSK that reached federal court on the issue of whether sexual
orientation was protected under Batson. Bushwick, supra note 90.
155
GSK, 740 F.3d at 489. See also Protected and Served?, supra note 153 (discussing
discrimination against LGBT in the courtroom and the need for intervention); Forbes, supra
note 107 (establishing the need for Batson with regard to LGBT to ensure nondiscriminatory
reasons for exclusion on juries).
156
See GSK, 740 F.3d at 481 (explaining that “Windsor requires that heightened scrutiny be
applied to equal protection claims involving sexual orientation”); see also United States v.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695–96 (2013) (holding sexual orientation requires something more
than rational basis as laws motivated purely by animus serve no legitimate purpose, which
is the standard for rational basis review); Barry, supra note 150, at 157 (supporting the
expansion of Batson for peremptories based on sexual orientation); Bushwick, supra note 90
153
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United States v. Windsor decision applied something more than rational
basis review on the grounds that laws motivated purely by animus serve
no legitimate purpose and thus fail rational basis, the Ninth Circuit’s
decision to apply a heightened level of scrutiny to juror discrimination
based on sexual orientation was proper.157 Although Windsor addressed
a different issue, specifically, the constitutionality of the Defense of
Marriage Act (“DOMA”), the Ninth Circuit was correct to mirror the
analytical framework developed in the Court’s decision. 158 If the Ninth
Circuit had not adopted the same heightened level of scrutiny described
in Windsor, then sexual orientation would still be subjected to rational
basis review.159 The problem with rational basis review as it relates to
sexual orientation is that it is “ordinarily unconcerned with the inequality
that results from the challenged state action.” 160 However, Batson is
utilized as a means to ensure equal protection thus heightened review is
necessary.161
In sum, the Ninth Circuit’s decision to expand Batson to sexual
orientation was imperative and pertinent. 162 An individual’s sexual
orientation is a private, personal matter and therefore, when it is revealed
during voir dire, either openly or through assumption, it should be
analyzed under the Batson framework to ensure an absence of intentional

(summarizing GSK and the arguments therein); Shay, supra note 151, at 407 (advocating for
LGBT equality and discussing the issues that they face during voir dire).
157
See GSK, 740 F.3d at 480 (following the analytical framework of Windsor to determine
heightened scrutiny is necessary for sexual orientation). The court in GSK specifically stated
that Windsor “was decided just last term and is dispositive of the question of the appropriate
level of scrutiny in this case.” Id.
158
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2695–96. The Windsor case reviewed DOMA, which denied
spousal benefits to the surviving spouse of a same-sex couple. Id. The Court held DOMA’s
definition of marriage was unconstitutional because it deprived an individual of the liberties
afforded to them under the Fifth Amendment. Id.
159
See GSK, 740 F.3d at 480 (establishing that because of the Windsor analysis for sexual
orientation in the context of DOMA, heightened scrutiny is appropriate for evaluation of
claims based on sexual orientation and equal protection). In GSK, the court noted that
Windsor did not “expressly announce the level of scrutiny it applied to the equal protection
claim at issue in that case, but an express declaration is not necessary.” Id. Because the
Windsor Court did not expressly state a level of scrutiny, the court referenced a solution
outlined in Witt v. Department of the Air Force. Id. (citing 527 F.3d 806, 816 (2008)). Witt
provides that when the Supreme Court refrains from identifying its method of analysis,
Supreme Court precedent is analyzed “by considering what the Court actually did, rather
than by dissecting isolated pieces of text.” Id. (quoting Witt, 527 F.3d at 816).
160
GSK, 740 F.3d at 482 (quoting McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425–26 (1961)).
161
See id. at 486 (discussing the goal behind Batson and reviewing the Court’s decision in
Windsor regarding heightened protection).
162
Id. at 489.
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discrimination.163 In addition, because the Ninth Circuit followed the
reasoning articulated in Windsor, a heightened level of scrutiny may now
be applied for equal protection claims involving sexual orientation. 164 As
a result, a Batson challenge is appropriate when a peremptory challenge
based on sexual orientation is exercised.165
B. Transgender and the Judiciary
The influx of discussion regarding sexual orientation and marriage as
it relates to the law has made the judicial system a frequent party to legal
disputes.166 The judiciary has inadvertently become familiar with sexual
orientation including characteristics and traits that define the class.167
Transgender, however, is a class with fewer recognizable
characteristics.168 Physical appearance, mannerisms, and certain words or
See id. (finding that where it is known an individual is homosexual and a peremptory
challenge is exercised on that basis, then Batson is proper); see also Vanessa H. Eisemann,
Striking a Balance of Fairness: Sexual Orientation and Voir Dire, 13 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 2
(2001) (contending sexual orientation for the purposes of voir dire should be treated similar
to race, religion, ethnicity, and gender).
164
See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693–96 (2013) (holding something more
than rational basis is necessary when analyzing claims based on sexual orientation and equal
protection, although the same was not expressly articulated in the Court’s opinion); see also
GSK, 740 F.3d at 484 (finding heightened scrutiny applies to classifications based on sexual
orientation).
165
GSK, 740 F.3d at 489.
166
See Richard Wolf, Supreme Court Delays Action on Gay Marriage, USA TODAY (Jan. 9, 2015,
4:23 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2015/01/09/supreme-courtgay-marriage/21454467/ [http://perma.cc/8WJS-LVD7] (discussing the recent and
ongoing discussion of same-sex marriage); see also R. U. Paige, Proceedings of the American
Psychological Ass’n, Inc., for the Legislative Year 2004: Minutes of the Annual Meeting of the
Council of Representative, AM. PSYCHOLOGIST (forthcoming Vol. 60, Issue 5),
http://www.apa.org/about/policy/marriage.aspx
[http://perma.cc/R4A5-A7DK]
(pointing out that research indicates that between forty and sixty percent of gay men and
between forty-five and eighty percent of lesbians are currently involved in a romantic
relationship) (citing J. Bradford et al., Nat’l Lesbian Health Care Survey: Implications for Mental
Health Care, 62 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 228 (1994)).
167
See Eisemann, supra note 163, at 2 (explaining that issues involving sexual orientation
and voir dire can arise in several ways leading to additional controversies the court must
resolve, or at least address); see also Forbes, supra note 107 (reviewing traits and
characteristics common to lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer individuals in
today’s culture).
168
See Know Your Rights, supra note 121 (outlining frequent misconceptions regarding
transgender individuals). While transgender is frequently used to describe a broad range of
identities and experiences that fall outside of the traditional understanding of gender, it is
important to note that not all individuals who do not conform to gender stereotypes identify
as transgender. Id. There are several individuals who do not conform to gender stereotypes,
but they also do not experience conflict between their gender identity and the gender
assigned to them at birth. Id. See also Discrimination Against Transgender People, supra note
109 (providing information about the discrimination of transgender individuals).
163
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phrases may be strong indicators of a transgender individual.169 These
traits can guide the judiciary in the identification of a transgender
individual as is necessary with a Batson challenge.170 First, Part III.B
examines how the law considers factors such as physical appearance,
mannerisms, and buzzwords in its identification of transgender.171 Next,
this Part scrutinizes why transgender individuals are in need of judicial
involvement.172 Finally, this Part argues transgender individuals should
be entitled to a heightened level of scrutiny. 173
Transgender is a group of individuals that have few recognizable and
understood traits, thus requiring the law to consider additional
characteristics.174 Courts should consider the apparel worn by an
individual that conflicts with that gender recognition because males and
females have certain biological features that often distinguish the sexes. 175
Transgender individuals commonly dress in attire that is consistent with
his or her gender identification.176 Furthermore, a transgender individual
Transgender individuals face similar experiences with regard to discrimination and
inequality that lesbians and gays experience, however, “transgender people face a range of
legal issues that LGB people rarely do: identity documents not reflective of one’s gender,
sex-segregated public restrooms and other facilities, dress codes that perpetuate traditional
gender norms, and barriers to access to appropriate health care.” Id.
169
See Forbes, supra note 107 (discussing different indicators for transgender individuals).
170
See infra Part III.B (examining factors for the Court to consider when identifying
transgender individuals).
171
See infra Part III.B (reviewing factors the courts should consider in their identification
of transgender).
172
See infra Part III.B (articulating the need for judicial involvement as a result of consistent
discrimination of transgender individuals).
173
See infra Part III.B (considering why transgender individuals are entitled to heightened
scrutiny).
174
See Coffey, supra note 119, at 164–65 (reviewing the judiciary’s acknowledgement and
response to transgender individuals in the courthouse). Coffey states that “[l]ittle legal
recourse is available to combat gender identity discrimination, because traditional
jurisprudence requires that individuals be classified into discrete and binary categories, even
when some people do not fit easily into one category.” Id. Furthermore, there is currently
no U.S. jurisprudence mechanism for handling transgender issues because the courts work
“‘within a paradigm positing a rigid view of mutually exclusive sexes’ and are ‘incapable of
coping with the medical proposition that sex operates along a continuum.’” Id. (quoting
Richard F. Storrow, Naming the Grotesque Body in the “Nascent Jurisprudence of Transsexualism,”
4 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 275, 333 (1993)).
175
See Forbes, supra note 107 (considering the mannerisms generally associated with men
and women). A transgender individual may also consult a physician to decide what, if any,
medical treatments are available to align the individual’s physical appearance with their
gender identity. Id.
176
See id. (discussing transgender individuals dressing in attire that is representative of the
sex with which they identify). Forbes notes that “[t]ransgender individuals often experience
emotional distress if their outward appearance (i.e., clothing, physical form, or facial
features) is not in accord with their gender identity.” Id. See also Franson, supra note 104, at
504 (describing one transgender child, “Jazz,” who was born biologically as a male but
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often displays mannerisms that are typical of men and women in an effort
to emulate his or her gender identification. 177 For example, females
typically accompany their speech with hand gestures and men often
refrain from excessive gestures with speech.178 Moreover, common words
and phrases or buzzwords can generally be attributed to a specific
gender.179 In conversation, females are prone to higher pitches, excessive
detail, and imagery whereas men are more prone to lower pitches and
direct conversation.180 Therefore, features like physical appearance,
identifies as a female) (quoting Alan B. Goldberg & Joneil Adriano, “I’m a Girl”—
Understanding Transgender Children, ABC 20/20 (Apr. 27, 2007), http://abcnews.go.com/
2020/story?id=3088298&page=1 [http://perma.cc/S266-RREC]). At age five, Jazz’s parents
allowed her to present herself as a female and allowed her to wear dresses and other feminine
clothing outside of the home. Id. (citing Goldberg & Adriano).
177
See Forbes, supra note 107 (stating transgender individuals observe the mannerisms of
the sex they identify with and portray those mannerisms). See also Male Mannerisms and
Posture, FEMALE TO MALE, http://www.femaletomale.org/ftm-passing-tips/malemannerisms/ [http://perma.cc/5KL9-PMJC] (providing several insights and tips for
appearing and presenting as a male through mannerisms and posture). For example, females
are more prone to crossing their legs than males are as well as shaking or tapping their foot
in the air. Id. Also, men tend to have a stronger grip than females when shaking hands. Id.
Additional mannerisms and postures include the following: “[m]en slouch more than
females, [men] don’t move their bodies forward as much when in conversation, [m]en don’t
smile with their mouth open as often like women do, [m]en use navigational terms such as
North, South, East, and West more often than women do, [and men] have bushier eyebrows.”
Id.
178
See
Gender
&
Gender
Identity,
PLANNED
PARENTHOOD,
http://www.plannedparenthood.org/health-info/sexual-orientation-gender/gendergender-identity [http://perma.cc/FS57-VZPA] (discussing common societal gender
stereotypes). Basic gender stereotypes include personality traits, domestic behaviors,
occupations, and physical appearance. Id. A personality trait may be that a woman is
expected to be passive and submissive and a man is expected to be self-confident and
aggressive. Id. One example of domestic behaviors is that women typically care for children
and men complete household repairs. Id. An occupational example might be women are
nurses and secretaries and men are doctors and construction workers. Id. Physical
appearance might be women are small and graceful, while men are tall and broadshouldered. Id.
179
See Frye & Rose, supra note 106, at 559 (discussing character traits to be cognizant of
when representing a transgender client). Frye and Rose stress the importance of addressing
a transgender client with the correct pronoun to preserve the client’s dignity and respect. Id.
See also Male Mannerisms and Posture, supra note 177 (explaining that men have a deeper voice
compared to females); Lannie Rose, How to Pass in 10 Not-so-Easy Steps, LANNIEROSE (May
2006), http://www.lannierose.com/words/howtopass.htm [http://perma.cc/G84S-A72R]
(contributing ideas and suggestions to appear as a male). Rose suggests developing “a
female voice” noting that a “resonant male voice is [a] dead giveaway.” Rose, supra note 179.
180
See Simma Lieberman, Differences in Male and Female Communication Styles, SIMMA
LIEBERMAN ASSOCS., http://www.simmalieberman.com/articles/maleandfemale.html
[http://perma.cc/4QBM-UMQR] (explaining variants between males and females when
communicating). See also Lisa Evans, Are We Speaking a Different Language? Men and Women’s
Communication Blind Spots, STRONG FEMALE LEAD (June 11, 2014, 5:07 AM),
http://www.fastcompany.com/3031631/strong-female-lead/are-we-speaking-a-different-
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mannerisms, and buzzwords are necessary for the law to be cognizant of
its identification of transgender persons.181
Comparable to sexual orientation, transgender individuals also
encounter prejudice, social biases, and bullying.182 If discrimination of this
nature warrants judicial intervention for sexual orientation, it also should
for transgender individuals.183 Absent legal involvement, the safeguards
currently in place, while not perfect, would be nonexistent. 184 Therefore,
transgender individuals should be entitled to the same judicial
language-men-and-womens-communication-blind-s
[http://perma.cc/Q42Y-8QFX]
(reviewing difference in communication styles between men and women). Common
perceptions of the variations in communicating between the sexes includes the idea that
women ask too many questions, lack the feeling of inclusion, wish to be viewed as a team
member, and seek companionship, whereas men like “individual acknowledgement” and
resolved disputes independently. Id.
181
See Forbes, supra note 107 (explaining the steps transgender individuals may take to
pursue physical expression aligned with their gender identity); see also Theodore R. Burns et
al., Competencies for Counseling with Transgender Clients, ASS’N FOR LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL,
AND TRANSGENDER ISSUES IN COUNSELING 2 (2009), http://www.counseling.org/
docs/competencies/algbtic_competencies.pdf?sfvrsn=3 [http://perma.cc/PW7X-FCAN]
(expressing the need for training and competencies when working with transgender clients
to ensure appropriate assistance).
182
See Jamie Johnson, Recognition of the Nonhuman: The Psychological Minefield of
Transgender Inequality in the Law, 34 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 153, 153 (2010) (acknowledging
the difficulties transgender individuals face). Johnson addresses the “psychological impact
felt by transgender individuals when ongoing discrimination and violence against them is
too often misunderstood, ignored, and perhaps perpetuated by legislatures and the
judiciary.” Id. at 154.
183
See SmithKline Beecham Corp. (“GSK”) v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471, 489 (9th Cir. 2014)
(establishing sexual orientation is a discriminatory basis for a peremptory challenge
therefore judicial involvement through a Batson challenge is necessary). See also Ryan
Goellner, The New Batson Challenge, Part II: Clarifying Windsor’s Standard of Review, U. CIN.
L. REV. (Apr. 1, 2014), http://uclawreview.org/2014/04/01/the-new-batson-challengepart-ii-clarifying-windsors-standard-of-review/ [http://perma.cc/E48Y-DMZN] (noting
the advancement made by the Ninth Circuit in its decision to extend Batson to sexual
orientation). Goellner suggests that because GSK is the first and only decision to extend
Batson challenges to sexual orientation, it “has [the] potential to influence other federal
circuits in expanding the safeguards of Batson.” Id. at 3. Federal courts have addressed the
rights of LGBT persons in several discriminatory situations. See generally Glenn v. Brumby,
663 F.3d 1312, 1321 (11th Cir. 2011) (holding the supervisor of an individual born male who
was subsequently diagnosed with gender identity disorder and alleged discrimination
against her supervisor on the basis of sex and medical condition did not have a sufficiently
important governmental interest to justify termination of the employee, and thus, violated
the Fourteenth Amendment); Pratt v. Indian River Cent. Sch. Dist., 803 F. Supp. 2d 135, 150–
52 (N.D.N.Y. 2011) (addressing an alleged violation of the Equal Access Act Section 1983,
Title IX, New York Human Rights Law and New York Civil Rights Law as it related to the
treatment of a high school student and his sister based on the student’s sexual orientation).
184
See GSK, 740 F.3d at 489 (finding sexual orientation is entitled to heightened protection
under Batson). Because this case expanded Batson to transgender individuals, it is
representative of one of the ongoing safeguards to consider the rights and equalities
homosexuals and implement protection in the judiciary. Id.
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involvement as sexual orientation.185 Moreover, transgender, like sexual
orientation, should be analyzed as a protected class entitled to heightened
scrutiny.186 Since Windsor established that rational basis review was no
longer the proper level of scrutiny for claims involving sexual orientation,
it too should no longer be the proper analysis for transgender.187 Similar
to sexual orientation, transgender represents a class of individuals that,
according to Windsor, should not be tolerant of a second-class status.188 If
the Supreme Court failed to acknowledge that a legitimate government
purpose was necessary when hindering the rights of individuals based on
sexual orientation, then rational basis would remain the proper standard
of review.189 Therefore, because transgender is comparable to sexual

See Know Your Rights, supra note 121 (advocating for the rights of transgender
individuals and drawing attention to their need for legal and judicial intervention). See also
Abigail W. Lloyd, Defining the Human: Are Transgendered People Strangers to the Law?, 20
BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 150, 152 (2005) (discussing transgender individuals and the
law). Lloyd focuses her discussion on the “dehumanizing rhetoric the law relies on to excuse
doctrinally unsupportable denial of legal protection for transgender people, before parsing
through the narrow room this judicial animus leaves for an injured transgender person to
state a claim.” Id. Specifically, Lloyd pursues transgender justice by analyzing the
discrimination transgender individuals face. Id.
186
See GSK, 740 F.3d at 484 (finding that Windsor requires the court to apply heightened
scrutiny to classifications based on sexual orientation); see also Discrimination Against
Transgender People, supra note 109 (advocating for more protection of transgender individuals
because of the ongoing discrimination). The decision to analyze sexual orientation under a
more rigorous review was based on the idea that restrictions or limitations on the basis of
sexual orientation should meet a legitimate government purpose to justify the restriction.
GSK, 740 F.3d at 480–84. Because transgender persons are also restricted on the basis of their
classification, they too should be entitled to a more rigorous review. Id.
187
See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695–96 (2013) (finding, but not expressly
stating, sexual orientation requires something more than rational basis review).
188
Id. at 2693. See also Laverne Cox, Beyond Second-Class Citizenship for Transgender People,
HUFF. POST (May 10, 2012, 5:12 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/lavernecox/transgender-rights_b_1506180.html [http://perma.cc/H9LS-HQD5] (explaining the
Gender Expression Nondiscrimination Act (“GENDA”) and articulating support for its
goal—transgender equality). Cox notes that “[m]any transgender folks are fighting for our
lives and basic civil rights all over [the] country.” Id. Cox explains that GENDA has been
passed for the past five years in the state assembly, but the bill has not yet been passed in the
Senate. Id. Because the bill has yet to achieve passage in the Senate, trans individuals are
still facing inequality in facets of life where other, nontransgender individuals, are not. Id.
189
See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2694 (discussing the Court’s concern with the public message
sent by DOMA regarding the status occupied by gays and lesbians in society); see also GSK,
740 F.3d at 480 (explaining that in past decisions the court applied rational basis review to
claims involving sexual orientation, however, on review of Windsor, the court now applied a
heightened level of scrutiny to claims based on sexual orientation). See generally Phillips v.
Perry, 106 F.3d 1420, 1425 (9th Cir. 1997) (applying rational basis review when upholding
Department of Defense and military policies that classified individuals on the basis of sexual
orientation).
185
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orientation as it relates to inequality and discrimination, the only
appropriate level of scrutiny is heightened scrutiny.190
C. Expanding Batson to Transgender Individuals
Batson should be explicitly expanded to include transgender
individuals.191 Traditionally transgender and sexual orientation are
coupled together and although the two concepts appear similar, they each
represent distinct characteristics.192
Since transgender and sexual
orientation are both susceptible to discrimination and inequality, these
individuals should be entitled to the same legal protections.193 However,
it is also because transgender and sexual orientation are comprised of
distinct characteristics that the Ninth Circuit’s expansion of Batson to
sexual orientation cannot be viewed as inclusive of transgender. 194 Part
III.C examines the critical differences between sexual orientation and
transgender by arguing that because transgender differs from sexual
orientation, transgender cannot currently be protected under Batson.195
Transgender should fall within the realm of heightened scrutiny
because the courts consider immutability and history of disparate
treatment in the determination of whether a class is subject to heightened
scrutiny.196 The Ninth Circuit’s holding in GSK determined that sexual
orientation would no longer be analyzed under traditional rational basis

See GSK, 740 F.3d at 489 (holding a heightened level of scrutiny is necessary for review
of sexual orientation as Batson challenges apply).
191
See infra Part III.D (proposing federal courts extend Batson to transgender).
192
See infra Part III.C (examining the distinctions between transgender and sexual
orientation).
193
See infra Part III.D (arguing that transgender, like sexual orientation, should be covered
under Batson).
194
See infra Part III.D (explaining that although transgender and sexual orientation share a
history of discrimination, transgender, unlike sexual orientation, is not protected by Batson
during voir dire).
195
See infra Part III.C (evaluating the distinctions between sexual orientation and
transgender).
196
See SmithKline Beecham Corp. (“GSK”) v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471, 483 (9th Cir. 2014)
(considering Windsor and the harm to gays and lesbians). The court points to Windsor’s
balance of the government’s interest against the harm or injury to gays and lesbians and
notes, “[t]he federal statute is invalid, for no legitimate purpose overcomes the purpose and
effect to disparage and injure those whom the State, by its marriage laws, sought to protect
in personhood and dignity.” Id. (quoting Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2696 (emphasis added)); see
also Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2681 (stating that DOMA violates basic due process and equal
protection principles). Windsor reiterates the Constitution’s guarantee of equality “‘must at
the very least mean that a bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group
cannot’ justify disparate treatment of that group.” Id. (quoting Dep’t of Agriculture v.
Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534–35 (2013)).
190
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review, but instead a “heightened level of scrutiny.” 197 The Ninth Circuit
relied heavily on the analysis outlined in Windsor, which articulated
“classifications based on sexual orientation that impose inequality on gays
and lesbians and send a message of second-class status be justified by
some legitimate purpose.”198
Immutability describes a trait or
characteristic that is beyond the individual’s control. 199 Transgender is an
immutable trait because gender identity establishes a psychological or
physiological condition.200 Although a transgender individual may elect
to undergo procedures for permanent gender reassignment, the
immutability correlates to the individual’s condition of not identifying
with his or her assigned sex.201 Moreover, transgender individuals face
discrimination in almost all spectrums of life, including education,
housing, employment, and health care.202 On review of factors like
immutability and past discrimination, the courts have held sexual
orientation is entitled to heightened scrutiny. 203
Therefore, since
transgender also exhibits and satisfies these factors, these individuals
should also be entitled to a heightened level of scrutiny.204

See supra Part II.A.3 (reviewing the Ninth Circuit’s decision in GSK that was heavily
influenced by Windsor).
198
GSK, 740 F.3d at 482–83.
199
See Diana Elkind, The Constitutional Implications of Bathroom Access Based on Gender
Identity: An Examination of Recent Developments Paving the Way for the Next Frontier of Equal
Protection, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 895, 902 (2007) (describing immutability as it applies to the
law and the Court’s consideration for heightened scrutiny).
200
Id. See also Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686–87 (1973) (stating suspect class
status is determined when the following four criteria are met: historical discrimination,
immutability, political powerlessness, and disparate treatment that is not based on actual
ability). Elkind responds to a presumed criticism of immutability as it relates to transgender,
stating the “criticism is misplaced, however, because the condition of not identifying with
one’s own biological gender is not alterable.” Elkind, supra note 199, at 902 & n.33 (citing
Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686).
201
See Elkind, supra note 199, at 902 & n.34 (clarifying what immutability means). Elkind
notes that Kari Balog reviews “the Court’s emphasis on group’s inability to change a trait as
an indicator of immutability and implying that the heredity of a trait may be of utmost
importance in the analysis.” Id. (citing Kari Balog, Equal Protection for Homosexuals: Why the
Immutability Argument Is Necessary and How it Is Met, 53 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 545, 556–57 (2005)).
202
See supra Part II.B.2 (addressing transgender discrimination in various aspects of life).
203
See Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686–87 (addressing the criteria for immutability and
acknowledging sexual orientation as a class subject to heightened scrutiny).
204
See Elkind, supra note 199, at 897 (urging the Supreme Court to classify transgender as
a suspect class due to their history of discrimination and immutability). Based on the history
of disparate treatment the transgender community has faced, as well as the immutability of
the trait, Elkind asserts transgender should be classified as a suspect class. Id. See also
Samantha J. Levy, Trans-Forming Notions of Equal Protection: The Gender Identity Class, 12
TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 141, 167–68 (2002) (discussing the benefits of classifying
transgender individuals as part of a “‘gender-identity’ class”).
197

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2016

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 50, No. 3 [2016], Art. 7

756

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50

D. Contribution
Since the Supreme Court’s 1986 decision in Batson, peremptory
challenges and voir dire have evolved.205 With the Ninth Circuit’s recent
expansion of Batson to include sexual orientation, given the opportunity
the Supreme Court should continue the evolution of Batson to cover
transgender individuals. Although there is currently no case before the
Court where a peremptory strike was used to remove a transgender
individual from the venire, solely based on that individual’s gender
identity, one will inevitably confront the Court. 206 No longer is a
peremptory strike permissible to excuse a member of the venire where
discrimination was the sole motivation for the strike. 207 The Court’s
articulation of the three step test for evaluating a Batson challenge has
helped overcome racial and gender discrimination among jurors.208 The
Ninth Circuit has elected to extend the protection of a Batson challenge
beyond race and gender to sexual orientation. 209 This recent extension is
a positive advancement for proponents of homosexual equality, however
transgender individuals remain unprotected by Batson.210 Part III.D.1
explains why the Court’s expansion of Batson to include transgender

See supra Part II.A.3 (discussing the expansion of Batson and its effect on race, gender,
and sexual orientation).
206
The author acknowledges the trial court would be the first to encounter the issue.
However, the trial court lacks the discretion to expand Batson to transgender individuals
because this class does not fall within the already established classifications applicable under
Batson. Therefore, the extension of Batson is likely and should occur at the upper levels of
the judicial hierarchy.
207
See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 100 (1986) (holding peremptory strikes motivated
by discriminatory reasons are unconstitutional and require further inquiry).
208
See supra Part II.A.2 (reviewing the Batson decision and the establishment of a three step
test).
209
See SmithKline Beecham Corp. (“GSK”) v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471, 489 (9th Cir. 2014)
(extending Batson to sexual orientation). See also Goellner, supra note 183 (reviewing GSK
and hypothesizing what the court’s decision will mean for future litigations). Goellner
explains that GSK is a notable decision because:
[I]t represents a further extension of Batson’s growing protections, but
more importantly, because it demonstrates how the Supreme Court’s
decision in Windsor invited lower federal courts to declare a standard of
review for laws that classify persons based on sexual orientation and
initiated a legal battle to distill the “spirit of Windsor” into a manageable
judicial standard.
Id.
210
See supra Part III.C (urging the Court to extend Batson to ensure equal protection during
voir dire for those who identify as transgender).
205
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individuals is the best solution.211 Part III.D.2 combats arguments against
Batson and its extension.212
This Note proposes that the Court should recognize discrimination of
transgender individuals during voir dire. Developing the analytical
framework to ensure equal protection to transgender individuals during
a peremptory strike is difficult. However, this Note does not suggest
starting from ground zero to support its goal, but rather proposes
extending the already existing test established in Batson be extended to
transgender individuals.213 Courts are well versed in Batson challenges
and are capable of correctly applying its analysis.214 Thus, simply
extending Batson to cover transgender individuals would ensure venire
equality.
1.

Batson Should be Extended to Include Transgender Individuals

The Ninth Circuit ruled a peremptory strike based on sexual
orientation is discriminatory, thus a Batson challenge properly requires
heightened scrutiny.215 Although this ruling advances equal protection
for gays and lesbians during the jury selection process, transgender

See infra Part III.D.1 (arguing the Court’s extension of Batson to include transgender
individuals would be the best solution to eliminate juror discrimination of that class).
212
See infra Part III.D.2 (combatting criticisms of Batson and the Court’s expansion of
Batson).
213
See Discrimination Against LGBT Jurors Remains Legal, supra note 133 (insinuating that
the government’s failure to take a position results in ongoing discrimination of LGBT jurors).
“[U]nder the Obama administration, the Department of Justice has declined to urge judges
to bar discrimination against LGBT potential jurors.” Id. See generally Batson v. Kentucky,
476 U.S. 79, 96–99 (1968) (establishing a three part test to evaluate potentially discriminatory
peremptory challenges).
214
See Sean G. Overland, The Shrinking Strike Zone: Avoiding Problems During Jury Selection
in the Age of Batson, THE JURY EXPERT (May 2010), http://www.thejuryexpert.com/wpcontent/uploads/OverlandTJEMay20101.pdf [http://perma.cc/LE88-C8QT] (identifying
the following six major cases involving Batson and the judiciary’s expansion of its principles:
J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 146 (1994) (applying Batson to strikes based on
gender); Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 59 (1992) (expanding Batson to strikes made by
criminal defendants); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 630 (1991) (finding
that Batson is applicable to civil litigation); Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 371–72
(1991) (extending Batson to peremptory strikes based on ethnicity); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S.
400, 415–16 (1991) (expanding Batson protections to defendants of any race); and Batson v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 100 (1986) (banning peremptory challenges based solely on juror’s
race)). As depicted in these six cases, the Court has attained experience in dealing with
Batson challenges. Id.
215
See SmithKline Beecham Corp. (“GSK”) v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471, 489 (9th Cir. 2014)
(holding that a peremptory strike on the basis of someone’s sexual orientation is
discriminatory, therefore, a Batson challenge is appropriate).
211
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individuals are still unrecognized.216 The inclusion of transgender in an
already established standard that is applicable to other highly
discriminated classes of persons is not only proper, but also expected. 217
Extending Batson to transgender individuals will help eliminate the use of
peremptory strikes motivated by bias or prejudice.218 Without the
inclusion of transgender in Batson challenges, individuals who identify as
transgender will have no recourse when exempted from jury service
because of his or her gender identification. 219
Historically, the Court elected to expand Batson to groups that were
subject to discrimination.220 Comparable to race, gender, and sexual
orientation, transgender also endures inequality and encompasses
characteristics that are unchangeable. 221 Transgender individuals are
susceptible to discrimination in various environments including academic

See id. (discussing that sexual orientation is subject to heightened scrutiny and a
peremptory challenge purely based on sexual orientation is impermissible). The GSK court
says nothing regarding transgender individuals, but instead focuses their discussion only on
sexual orientation. Id. Moreover, the court discusses and evaluates the impact the conduct
had on the “gay community.” Id. at 476. The court’s inherent language is representative of
their intent only to include sexual orientation, or rather gay and lesbian, in Batson challenges.
Id.
217
See Eric Lesh, From Marriage Recognition to the Jury Box, the Windsor Decision Continues
to
Extend
the
Promise
of
Equality,
LAMBDA LEGAL (Jan.
30,
2014),
http://www.lambdalegal.org/blog/20130130_windsor-continues-to-extend-promise-ofequality [http://perma.cc/NFL8-RQCN] (discussing the Ninth Circuit decision in GSK to
extend Batson to sexual orientation is one step toward advancement of equality for gender
identity and sexual orientation).
218
See DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 43, at 234 (explaining how the implementation of
Batson was to help eliminate attorney bias and discrimination geared toward potential
jurors); see also Ogletree, supra note 73, at 1101 (noting that Batson has been viewed as a “major
accomplishment in the effort to eliminate this form of jury discrimination”).
219
See Juror Non-Discrimination Act/Jury ACCESS Act, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN,
http://www.hrc.org/resources/entry/juror-non-discrimination-act-jury-access-act
[http://perma.cc/7B4Y-VY7M] (introducing the Juror Non-Discrimination Act and Jury
Access for Capable Citizens and Equality in Service Selection (“ACCESS”) Act as proposed
legislation that would prohibit attorneys from seeking to strike a potential federal juror based
on their sexual orientation or gender identity). The Jury Non-Discrimination Act was
reintroduced in the 113th Congress in the House of Representatives by Representative Susan
Davis, a Democrat from California, on January 18, 2013. Id. Senators Jeanne Shaheen, a
Democrat from New Hampshire, Sheldon Whitehouse, a Democrat from Rhode Island, and
Susan Collins, a Republican from Maine, reintroduced the Jury ACCESS Act in the Senate on
January 22, 2013. Id. The proposed legislations are a result of the Supreme Court’s failure to
address the discrimination in jury service based on sexual orientation and gender identity.
Id. Discrimination of LGBT individuals “undermines the justice system and could hurt crime
victims by preventing a fair trial by a jury of their peers.” Id.
220
See supra Part II.A.3 (outlining the Court’s expansion of Batson).
221
See supra Part II.B.1 (identifying characteristics of transgender individuals, including
immutable traits).
216
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settings, the workplace, and receiving health care benefits. 222 The crux of
a Batson challenge is the assurance of equal protection. In the seminal case,
Batson v. Kentucky, the Court relied heavily on equal protection principals
in its decision to establish Batson challenges.223 Inequality is a strong
precursor in the decision to extend Batson. As transgender individuals
encounter frequent discrimination, the Court should extend Batson to
cover transgender.
Moreover, transgender is an immutable trait.224 Everyone is assigned
a gender at birth, but of key importance among transgender individuals
is the internal conflict such a person faces when he or she does not identify
with their assigned sex. The inability to control, or change, the sex an
individual is designated at conception is universal. However, unlike those
who identify with and are accepting of their assigned sex, transgender
individuals do not share the same contentment. Transgender individuals
may elect to undergo medical procedures to alter their assigned
anatomical biological sex, but that is not what the immutability is
attributable to.225 Specifically, the immutable characteristic is the
psychological and physiological trait.226 As such, the Court should extend
Batson to include transgender individuals because, in addition to a history
of discrimination, transgender is an immutable trait.
Finally, as transgender individuals become more prevalent in society
and the media, so too should the safeguards that would ensure their equal
protection in the judicial process. The Ninth Circuit recognized the need
to extend Batson to cover sexual orientation, but sexual orientation and
transgender are not mutually exclusive.227 As a result, the Ninth Circuit’s
decision has no impact on transgender individuals. While the Ninth
Circuit’s decision might serve as a conduit for the advocacy of gays and
lesbians, transgender individuals will continue to fall outside the scope of
Batson. The Court must continue its evolution of Batson to include
transgender individuals. Without the Court’s expansion, there will be no
remedy available to transgender persons removed from juries, even in the
face of blatant discrimination.

See supra Part II.B.2 (discussing the discrimination of transgender individuals in
schools, work environments, health care settings, and prisons).
223
See supra Part II.A.2 (reviewing the Court’s decision in Batson).
224
See supra note 204 and accompanying text (identifying transgender as an immutable
trait).
225
See supra Part II.B.1 (defining transgender and establishing that medical procedures are
available to alter one’s anatomical sex).
226
See supra note 204 and accompanying text (acknowledging the immutability of
transgender individuals).
227
See supra notes 107–11 and accompanying text (distinguishing sexual orientation from
transgender individuals).
222
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Commentary

Batson is pivotal in ensuring that minorities are treated equally during
the jury selection process.228 This Note proposes the Court continue to
evolve and expand Batson again to include transgender individuals.
Including this immutable class in Batson’s protections will help prevent
venire discrimination against a group of persons that too frequently face
inequality. While this proposition advocates for the extension of Batson,
there are critics of Batson and its progeny.
Since the Batson decision, peremptory challenges have been heavily
scrutinized.229 Even in the decision itself, Justice Marshall’s concurrent
opinion advocated for “eliminating peremptory challenges entirely.” 230
Although discrimination is a sincere concern, some suggest Batson is not a
useful means to prevent discrimination.231 However, without Batson,
there is no regulation to ensure discrimination was not the motivating
factor for using a peremptory challenge. 232
Absent the Court’s
development of Batson challenges, individuals could be excluded from
serving on juries without reason; a right that every U.S. citizen should be
See supra Part II.A.1 (explaining the Batson decision and its impact on equality among
the venire).
229
See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 105 (1986) (showing that Justice Marshall agreed
with the Court’s decision that the use of a peremptory challenge to remove blacks from a
jury is a clear Equal Protection violation, however, allowing the defendants to challenge the
racially discriminatory use of a peremptory challenge is an insufficient remedy); see also
Alschuler, supra note 38, at 157 (noting that Batson, while an appropriate remedy at the time
for addressing racial discrimination, inevitably became problematic); Jury—Should The
Peremptory Challenge Be Abolished? (2015), http://law.jrank.org/pages/7925/Jury-SHOULDPEREMPTORY-CHALLENGE-BE-ABOLISHED.html
[http://perma.cc/QXR7-E44P]
(discussing critiques of Batson challenges). One of the biggest arguments against Batson is
that it deprives the attorney of total discretion and turns a peremptory challenge into a
challenge for cause, which requires a full justification for its use. Jury—Should The Peremptory
Challenge Be Abolished?, supra note 229. Other arguments include the increased cost of
litigation and the breeding ground for discrimination. Id.
230
Jameson B. Carroll et al., Striking Back Against Peremptory Strikes, TORT TRIAL & INS.
PRACTICE SELECTION AM. BAR ASS’N (2010), http://www.kslaw.com/imageserver/
KSPublic/Library/publication/4-09%20ABA.pdf [http://perma.cc/S5CY-5DC8] (quoting
Batson, 476 U.S. at 107 (1986)).
231
See DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 43, at 236 (pointing out Justice Marshall’s critique
of Batson). Justice Marshall did not disagree with the anti-discrimination principles of Batson,
but instead argued that the “Court has consistently underestimated the interest litigants will
have in attempting to evade Batson with pretexts . . . [by underestimating] the interest
litigants have in continuing to discriminate by race and gender if they can get away with it.”
Id. (quoting Ogletree, supra note 72, at 1104).
232
See Jonathan B. Mintz, Note, Batson v. Kentucky: A Half Step in the Right Direction (Racial
Discrimination and Peremptory Challenges Under the Heavier Confines of Equal Protection), 72
CORNELL L. REV. 1026, 1029 (1987) (discussing discrimination and peremptory challenges
before Batson).
228
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able to participate in. Batson is necessary to ensure all individuals
regardless of race, gender, sexual orientation, or transgender
identification can fulfill their civic duties and play an essential role in the
justice system—serving on a jury. While Batson is not a perfect resolution
to the issue of discrimination in judicial proceedings, the test still provides
some barrier to voir dire discrimination, and thus, is necessary.233
Additionally, critics contend the Ninth Circuit’s extension of Batson to
sexual orientation was unnecessary. Unlike race and gender, sexual
orientation is not always transparent, making the expansion of Batson to
sexual orientation more complicated than its former extensions.234 Even
further, a question that could elicit whether a member of the venire is gay
is one that would be impermissible.235 However, Batson needs to be
applicable to provide protection when the issue does arise. The stigma
that is attached to sexual orientation provokes ongoing discrimination of
that class and as such, warrants Batson’s protection during voir dire.236 For
these reasons, the Ninth Circuit’s decision to expand Batson for claims
involving sexual orientation during jury selection was proper.237
However, it did not go far enough as those who identify as transgender
are still without Batson protection.
Finally, critics contend that transgender falls under the category of
sexual orientation. This contention is misplaced because the former does

See Ogletree, supra note 73, at 1101 (stating Batson has been viewed as a “major
accomplishment” in the effort to eliminate jury discrimination).
234
See Race and Sexual Orientation: Commonalities, Comparisons, and Contrasts Relevant to
Military Policy, http://psychology.ucdavis.edu/faculty_sites/rainbow/html/military_
race_comparison.html [http://perma.cc/A8MH-QJU6] (outlining differences between race
and sexual orientation).
235
See Paul R. Lynd, Juror Sexual Orientation: The Fair Cross-Section Requirement, Privacy,
Challenges for Cause, and Peremptories, 46 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 231, 246 (1998) (stating an attorney
may not directly inquire as to a potential juror’s sexual orientation). Lynd discusses the
difficulty of identifying an individual’s sexual orientation based on stereotypical behavior.
Id. Moreover, Lynd concludes that the “only accurate way to know a person’s sexual
orientation remains an individual’s self-declaration.” Id. at 245.
236
See Pro & Con Arguments:
“Should Gay Marriage Be Legal?”, PROCON.ORG,
http://gaymarriage.procon.org [http://perma.cc/6F7Z-TZFM] (reviewing both stances on
the issue of gay marriage, indicative of the lack of uniform acceptance in U.S. society). See
also Seth Forman, Five Arguments Against Gay Marriage: Society Must Brace for Corrosive
Change, NY DAILY NEWS (June 23, 2011, 4:00 AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/
opinion/arguments-gay-marriage-society-brace-corrosive-change-article-1.131144
[http://perma.cc/N6CQ-UEMS] (discussing anti-homosexual unions). Forman notes the
following five arguments: (1) religious freedom; (2) rights of children; (3) whether traditional
marriage; (4) education; and (5) husbands. Id.
237
See Goellner, supra note 183 (describing the Ninth Circuit’s decision to extend Batson to
sexual orientation as “notable”).
233
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not correspond to the latter or vice versa.238 If transgender is coupled with
gay, lesbian, and bisexual, then it would already be covered under a Batson
challenge per the Ninth Circuit’s decision. This argument fails because
sexual orientation and transgender are not mutually exclusive. 239 Due to
a lack of understanding regarding transgender individuals, many assume
sexual orientation encompasses transgender, but this assumption is
incorrect.
Since there are distinct differences between the two
classifications, the assumption that the Ninth Circuit’s ruling to expand
Batson to sexual orientation also covers transgender is misguided.240 The
term transgender cannot be found anywhere in the Ninth Circuit’s
decision.241 In addition, the Ninth Circuit did not impliedly include, or
intend to include, transgender with sexual orientation. 242 Moreover,
because transgender is poorly understood and frequently discriminated
against, it should be entitled to protection under Batson.
In sum, Batson should be expanded to include transgender
individuals. If the Court fails to evolve and expand Batson, venire
discrimination on the basis of one’s gender identity will continue to be
permissible. Following the reasoning applied to race, gender, and sexual
orientation, transgender individuals more than satisfy the requirements to
warrant Batson protection.
IV. CONCLUSION
Batson made it possible for minorities to be protected from blatant
discrimination during voir dire. The establishment that race, gender, and
sexual orientation are classifications that cannot be used as a reason to
remove a member from the venire was substantial. While these groups
may find solace in the judiciary’s acknowledgement of discrimination,
transgender individuals cannot share that sentiment.
Currently,
transgender individuals face an alarmingly high rate of discrimination in

See supra Part II.B.1 (explaining what it means to identify as a transgender individual
compared to what sexual orientation identifies).
239
See supra Part II.B (distinguishing transgender from sexual orientation and asserting the
two classes are not equivalent).
240
See generally SmithKline Beecham Corp. (“GSK”) v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471, 489 (9th
Cir. 2014) (extending Batson to sexual orientation after rigorous review of Windsor). The court
focuses only on sexual orientation in its decision to extend Batson. Id.
241
See id. at 471–89 (reviewing the court’s published opinion of which there is no mention
or use of the term transgender).
242
Id. at 489. The Ninth Circuit did not include a comparison or distinction between
transgender and sexual orientation. Id. at 471–89. Instead, the court based its holding on
Windsor and the evaluation of sexual orientation. Id. This is suggestive that the court did
not imply that transgender would be encompassed in its decision to extend Batson. GSK, 740
F.3d at 489.
238
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nearly all aspects of life. Furthermore, transgender individuals are
susceptible to inequality because of inadequate or absent legal barriers.
On consideration of only one of these facts, the Court should be inclined
to expand Batson to cover transgender individuals. However, transgender
individuals present more than just discriminatory treatment in several
realms of life. The fact that transgender individuals are still widely
misunderstood should by itself alarm the judiciary and render the need
for action. Batson is an already established and workable solution.
Therefore, the Court should formally recognize transgender as a class in
need of protection under Batson as it has previously done with race,
gender, and sexual orientation.
In the hypothetical described at the beginning of this Note, the judge
reminded GSK’s counsel that Abbott’s peremptory strike against Juror
C—a self-identified transgender male—is not subject to a Batson challenge.
Even in light of the blatant discrimination that prompted Abbott’s strike,
Juror C had no recourse. Although the purpose of Batson is to ensure
venire equality, only those who fall within a selected class identified by
the Supreme Court may utilize Batson’s protection. If Abbott’s counsel
had removed Juror C because he was African American, the only female
among males, or even on the basis of his homosexuality, then Batson
would apply. However, Abbott’s counsel removed Juror C because he
openly identified as a transgender male, and this action, while deplorable,
was permissible. If the Court had previously extended Batson to include
transgender individuals, Juror C would have remained on the jury and
exercised his civic duty. Accordingly, the Court should acknowledge the
existence of discrimination toward transgender individuals during voir
dire and expand Batson to include that class of people as this Note
proposes. Until the Court extends Batson to include individuals like Juror
C, those who identify as transgender may continually be peremptorily
removed during voir dire and denied the opportunity to participate in the
judicial system.
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